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ABSTRACT
Woodroof, Parker J. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2015. Causerelated Marketing and Shareholder Value: an Event Study Analysis.
Major Professor: Dr. George Deitz
Drawing from signaling theory, this study investigates the shareholder
wealth effects of marketing investments into cause-related marketing (CRM)
campaigns. Although research has generally supported a positive relationship
between sponsorship agreements and shareholder wealth, the relationship still
remains unclear for several sponsorship categories, including when sponsorship
is connected to a cause. Moreover, there have been many discrepancies in the
literature as to whether or not corporate social responsibility (CSR) behavior
should be practiced by the firm, as those funds could be used as a dividend
payout to the shareholder or invested back into the firm for research and
development of new products. This study extends prior research by suggesting
that although CRM has been shown to have a positive impact on key product
market outcome variables of the firm (e.g., consumer attitudes, corporate image
and reputation, brand loyalty, and purchase intention), the initial financial
implications are not as easily justified. This assertion is demonstrated by
identifying a significant negative shareholder wealth effect associated with the
announcement of cause-related marketing campaigns. A few factors specific to
the firm, the nonprofit, and the alliance help explain cross-sectional variation in
abnormal stock returns. Most of these factors are well documented in the
sponsorship and CRM literature, although two factors, namely nonprofit
governmental resource dependence and in-kind donations, have received little
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attention. Ironically, of the factors investigated, it is nonprofit governmental
resource dependence and in-kind donations that investors are most sensitive
toward when considering CRM investments of the firm. This study provides a
framework and certain boundary conditions for executives to consider when
deciding to utilize CRM as a marketing communication tool.

Keywords: Shareholder Value, Cause-related Marketing, Event Study,
Reputation, Government Resource Dependency, In-kind Donations
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
For years, economists such as Milton Friedman have advocated that the
objective of the firm is to maximize returns (i.e., profits) for its investors (i.e.,
shareholders). Under this philosophy, the springboard for all executive decisions
is rooted in profit maximization for those providing the capital for the business.
Anything less than this approach would violate the fiduciary responsibility that
executives have been trusted with by the owners of the company. Although this
argument has had its fair share of critics (Bowen, 1953; Fama, 1980;
Weidenbaum and Vogt, 1988), it is still considered to be a pillar of conventional
economic theory.
Over the past few decades, however, the corporation’s social
responsibility (CSR) has been thrust into the limelight as an expected business
practice. CSR is defined as, ‘the policy and practice of a corporation’s social
involvement over and beyond its legal obligations for the benefit of the society at
large (Enderle and Travis, 1998). Although the increased focus of this practice
was the result of financial scandals, investor losses, and corporate reputational
damage, the social norms ultimately levied on corporations make not engaging in
CSR behaviors extremely risky. Conventional economic theory posits that
executives are required to make decisions that maximize the wealth of their
shareholders by making decisions that maximize the present value of the firm’s
future cash flows (Friedman, 1962; Copeland, Murrin, and Koller, 1994). In other
words, executives have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders every time
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they make an investment, and social investments are no exception. They must
be justified by an extensive process of reasoning as having a realistic chance of
manifesting long-term economic gain (Davis, 1960). Be that as it may, the
literature seems to bend toward a partisan view of a firm’s social responsibilities.
An alternative perspective is that a corporation’s social responsibility and
its responsibility to shareholders do not have to be at such odds. In fact, they can
and should be intricately interwoven into the very fabric of the other (Davis,
1960). Traditionally, proponents of a narrow view of CSR (i.e., firms only engage
in CSR behavior that is related to its core business practice) were not
unequivocally opposed to the idea that firms indeed have societal obligations that
must be satisfied (Friedman, 1970). They were, however, opposed to business
activities that went outside of the narrowly defined role of the business (Schwartz
and Saiia, 2012). In fact, the primary objection of those advocating for a narrow
view of CSR pertain not to social behavior that is naturally anticipated by the
shareholder for the betterment and safety of the firm, but social behaviors
performed by the firm that are unanticipated (Friedman, 1970). The reason this is
of importance is that a capital market is a place where investors categorize
based on preferences for corporate giving relative to personal giving and on the
firm’s market value in which they invest (Baron, 2007). In other words, investors
for whom corporate giving is a near substitute for personal giving will most likely
hold shares of firms that dedicate a significant amount of resources to a
diverseness of causes (i.e., a broad view of CSR). In turn these types of
investors make few personal gifts (Baron, 2007). Alternatively, investors for
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whom corporate giving is a poor substitute hold few if any shares in firms that
consistently exhibit significant giving of company resources to social causes
(Baron, 2007). Naturally, these investors make personal gifts liberally. But still,
proponents and opponents of a narrow view of CSR typically frame their
arguments to suggest that economic theory and corporate social behaviors
cannot coexist.
Cause related marketing (CRM), a more strategic form of CSR, is
traditionally thought to circumvent the aforementioned tension – between the
socially concerned and investors of the firm – by simultaneously accomplishing
the marketing goals of the firm and advancing the mission-related work of the
cause. CRM is currently one of the fastest growing marketing communication
strategies around the world, with projected 2015 North American expenditures of
approximately $1.92 billion, a 3.7% increase from 2014 and over 16% increase
since 2010 (IEG Sponsorship, 2015). Although CRM campaigns have been
credited with producing positive consumer attitudes towards the business and
greater purchase likelihood for its products (Brown and Dacin 1997; Strahilevitz
and Meyers 1998; Pracejus, Olsen, and Brown 2003; Trimble and Rifon, 2006),
other research suggests that the value of CRM may not necessarily justify its
cost, both in terms of short-term sales (Pracejus and Olsen, 2004) and long-term
perceptions (Porter and Kramer, 2006). There have also been empirical
examples where CRM efforts have produced skepticism, cynicism and even
negative attitudes toward the firm (Elving, 2013; Kim and Lee, 2009; Manuel,
Youn, and Yoon, 2014; Mohr, Eroglu, and Ellen, 1998; O’Sullivan, 1997).
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Therefore, the fact that consumers have responded inconsistently to social
investments has led to an extensive examination of this relationship through
effects on consumer-based measures. However, the effects of these social
investments on market-based responses (e.g., changes in shareholder wealth)
have received relatively little attention. This lack of confirmation has left social
investments, such as CRM, uninformed. Additionally, Gardner and Schuman
(1998) suggest that sponsorship-related marketing efforts, which include CRM,
could in fact play a role in forging business linkages, and ultimately serve as a
signal to the investment community. As a result, there has been a significant
amount of research examining the market-based responses to sponsorship
announcements, although CRM has been relatively neglected (Cornwell, 2008;
Deitz, Evans, and Hansen, 2012; Pruitt et al., 2004).
The most common method employed to examine these market-based
responses to sponsorships has been through event-study analysis. The eventstudy method is designed to capture investor reactions to new information
provided to financial markets. It accomplishes this by calculating the abnormal
returns to stock prices at or around the time of the announcement (Brown and
Warner, 1985). In short, the investment community judges the strength and
quality of the new information, and that judgment is, therefore, reflected in the
changing stock price of the firm.
Despite the obvious push to further examine the contribution of marketing
actions and strategies to the financial success of the firm, there has been no
examination of the effect that CRM investments have on changes in shareholder
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wealth. Because social investments involve the allocation of scarce firm
resources, examination of these investments and their effect on firm financial
metrics could solidify the potential contribution that social investments provide
the firm. This gap in the literature, in communion with the call by investors and
marketers for further accountability and transparency of marketing expenditures
(Luo and Bhattachary, 2006; Reibstein, Day, and Wind, 2009), is the basis for
examining the role of CRM announcements and their effects on shareholder
wealth.
Drawing from signaling theory, this research examines how the stock
market reacts to the announcement of CRM campaigns. The stock market, like
any other market, is a collective outcome of a voluminous amount of individual
decisions. We posit that the investment community, which comprises the stock
market, will utilize signals sent by the firm to establish the value and quality of the
CRM campaign. These signals are sent both intentionally and inadvertently
(Connelly et al., 2011). Signaling theory offers an explanatory mechanism for the
way consumers and investors, alike, react and evaluate investment decisions of
the firm – decisions including cause-related marketing investments.
The motivation behind the present study is to provide an empirical basis
for the conditions that constitute successful CRM behaviors of the firm.
Varadarajan and Menon (1988) advocate that companies should no longer be
deliberating about whether or not to make social investments as that argument is
outdated and short sighted. Rather, companies should be exploring ways to
engage in strategic cause marketing that mutually benefits the company, its
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shareholders, and the communities in which it has a presence. Rappaport (1983)
suggests that the bridge between the narrow and broad CSR philosophies can
be found with exploration into how well the decisions of executives relate to the
strategic plan of the business and to the creation of “value” for the firm. Value, as
Rappaport sees it, can only be obtained by considering the long and short-term
implications of investments, as opposed to obsessing over the short-term
creation of wealth for the firm’s shareholders. Therefore, this study has chosen to
investigate perceptions of specific firm, nonprofit, and alliance factors that should
provide boundary conditions for which companies abide by when utilizing CRM
as a marketing communication tool.
In summary, in order to gain a better understanding of investor-based
reactions following the announcement of CRM campaigns, it is important to
assess the potential impact CRM has on shareholder wealth. This study,
therefore, attempts to answer the following research questions:
•

Are investors sensitive to the announcement of CRM campaigns?

•

What boundary conditions affect the direction and magnitude of
shareholder response to CRM campaigns?

In order to answer these questions, this study utilized the event study method in
order to calculate abnormal stock returns for firms at or around the time of the
announcement, taking into account various firm, nonprofit, and alliance factors,
and included controls for the effects of unobserved latent variables. This study
also took considerable time to ensure that there were no foreseeable
confounding events that would call into question the results of this study. Lastly,
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this study investigates the research questions utilizing a data set composed of a
variety of public firms that initiated a total 140 unique CRM campaigns.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Chapter two provides
a review of the literature, which unpacks how CRM has evolved from a general
corporate social responsibility of the firm to the modern understanding of CRM as
marketing communication tool and concludes with how CRM should continue to
evolve subsequently. Chapter three includes a discourse on signaling theory and
its importance to stock market analysis of CRM announcements, along with an
exposition as to why shareholder value is of the utmost importance for
understanding the impact of investment behavior. Chapter three also provides
the conceptual development of the variables of interest in this study and formal
hypotheses are presented. Chapter four thoroughly examines the event study
methodology utilized for this study, along with a brief description of estimation of
market reactions, theoretical assumptions, and statistical and inferential issues is
also included within this chapter. In chapter five we discuss the results of this
study, which provide marketing managers with clear insights for future
investment in CRM campaigns. We conclude with chapter six, which delivers a
dialogue of the theoretical contributions made, managerial implications, research
limitations and areas for future research. Chapter six concludes the study with
the summary and conclusion of this research. We now turn our attention to a
review of the literature in order to provide a basis for our exploration.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
FROM CSR TO STRATEGIC CRM
The social responsibility of the firm has been debated for many years.
It was not until 1953 that Howard R. Bowen first asked the question, “What
responsibilities to society may businessmen reasonably be expected to
assume?” Bowen spoke of CSR like this: “It refers to the obligations of
businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow
those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of
our society.” Bowen quoted Fortune magazine’s survey (1946, as cited in Bowen,
1953, p. 44), wherein the magazine’s editors thought that CSR, or the “social
consciousness,” of managers meant that business men and women were
responsible for the consequences of their behavior in a domain somewhat wider
than that covered by their profit-and-loss statements (cited in Bowen, 1953, p.
44). It is astonishing that 93.5% of the businesspersons responding agreed with
the statement.
Following Bowen’s discussion and conceptualization of CSR, it was
suggested by Davis (1960) that corporate social responsibility referred to firm
decisions and actions taken for reasons at least partially beyond the firm’s direct
economic or technical interest. It is this definition that collides head on with Milton
Friedman’s (1962) vision for corporations. Friedman’s position about the social
responsibilities of businesses are of paramount importance and extremely
controversial. In fact, most everyone who writes about CSR behavior of the firm
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writes partially in reaction to Milton Friedman. Although Friedman posited in
Capitalism and Freedom (1962), that the one and only obligation of business is to
maximize its profits while engaging in “open and free competition without
deception or fraud”, he later suggested in The Social Responsibility of Business
is to Increase its Profits (1970) that business executives are obligated to follow
the wishes of shareholders while obeying the laws and the “ethical customs” of
the society. It is important to understand that at no point does Friedman insinuate
that businesses have no social responsibilities that go past profit maximization.
He does, however, suggest that if they do, it is unclear as to what it that should
look like. It is for this reason that Friedman, who was demonized by proponents
of a broad view of CSR, should be more properly described as representing the
“narrow” version of CSR instead of someone whose ideology is wholly barren of
it (Schwartz and Saiia, 2012).
Those advocating for a narrow view of CSR contend that businesses
should engage in social behavior that is within the scope of the business’
mission. Proponents of a broader view of CSR suggest that businesses should
make decisions that go beyond the firm’s direct economic or technical interest.
But which philosophy is more genuine? Which one is best? What are the
boundary conditions of a firm’s social responsibility? Should there be any
boundaries? Below are a few examples that help clarify these probing questions,
which have obvious merit. Google abided by Chinese law by filtering content
found through its google.cn search engine (e.g., “Tiananmen Square”), was
Google acting in a socially responsible manner? UBS Bank spent shareholder
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funds to voluntarily omit its carbon emissions when there was no legal obligation
to do so. Was this socially responsible or irresponsible? Should a publically
traded company like Ben and Jerry’s (known for its explicit social mission) be
allowed to refuse an offer by Unilever to buy its stock at a 25 percent premium by
insisting that Unilever continue its practice of donating 7.5 percent of pretax
profits to charity?
Depending on whom you consult, the answer to these questions may be
quite polarized. Therefore, perhaps these types of questions of should be done
away with altogether because of their subjectivity. Perhaps the question should
simply be: how do businesses and the communities they impact coexist most
effectively and efficiently long-term? In his book Business and Society, George
Steiner (1971) makes a great case for how businesses and society can bridge
the gap between the aforementioned ideologies for mutual effectiveness.
Although Steiner had a propensity to defer to the broader view of CSR, he did
have this to say:
Business is and must remain fundamentally an economic institution,
but…it does have responsibilities to help society achieve its basic goals
and does, therefore, have social responsibilities. The larger a company
becomes, the greater are these responsibilities, but all companies can
assume some share of them at no cost and often at a short-run as well as
a long-run profit. The assumption of social responsibilities is more of an
attitude, of the way a manager approaches his decision-making task, than
a great shift in the economics of decision-making. It is a philosophy that
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looks at the social interest and the enlightened self-interest of business
over the long run as compared with the old, narrow, unrestrained short-run
self-interest (Steiner, 1971, p. 164).
Therefore, neither side should dig its heels in when debating this topic. Neither
Milton Friedman’s narrow CSR position, nor the broader CSR position is wholly
right in and of itself. An honest observer should concede there is an incredible
amount of ambiguity surrounding the firm’s social responsibility. How CSR is
interpreted and whether it has relevance in the business world will continue to
elicit a variation of responses. Therefore, what must be remembered is that no
matter where an individual resides on this continuum, for the sake of businesses
and society, strategy must never be compromised. CSR behavior and the
maximization of shareholder wealth can and should be an iron sharpening iron
concept. Long-term a firm should improve its position in the market if it is taking
care of its community along the way.
CAUSE-RELATED MARKETING
CRM, a more strategic facet of CSR, has received particular corporate
interest over the past few decades as a potential solution to the CSR debate.
Succinctly, CRM is the alignment of corporate philanthropy and well-informed
business interest. Varadarajan and Menon (1988) narrowly defined as:
the process of formulating and implementing marketing activities that are
characterized by an offer from the firm to contribute a specified amount to
a designated cause when customers engage in revenue-providing
exchanges that satisfy organizational and individual objectives (pg. 60).
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This type of CRM is called transaction-based. Since then the definition has
evolved and broadened to include, “partnerships between a company and a
nonprofit organization for mutual benefit” (Mohr, Sengupta, and Slater, 2012). In
other words, the firm gains, in theory, a point of differentiation through its
strategic philanthropy and the recipients of the philanthropy experience improved
living conditions as well. More specifically, the goal behind CRM is to engage
various stakeholders of the firm both emotionally and cognitively, in hopes of
creating a stronger brand image.
A significant body of research has developed investigating the effects of
CRM on a variety of factors including consumer purchase intentions (Webb and
Mohr, 1998), consumer choice (Barone et al., 2000), and consumer attitudes
(Barnes, 1992). There has been other research that has focused on various
moderating variables that influence the factors mentioned above including fit or
congruence between the cause and the firm (Pracejus and Olsen, 2004), the
type of product involved in the campaign (Strahilevitz and Myers, 1998), various
donation elements (Ellen et al., 2000), firm reputation (Elving, 2013) and
familiarity of the cause (Lafferty and Goldsmith, 2005). Moreover, a study
conducted by Creyer and Ross (1997) found that consumers are more than
willing to reward or punish companies – by paying higher or lower prices –
depending on how they perceive the ethical conduct of the companies’ CRM
efforts. Still the impact that CRM has on performance variables of the firm
remains mixed, depending on campaign idiosyncrasies and context (van der
Brink et al., 2006).
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Although CRM has enjoyed a rather long history, it was not formally
referred to or recognized as CRM until 1983 when American Express ran the first
“CRM” campaign that supported the restoration of the Statue of Liberty. The
concept was relatively straightforward, with approximately $4 million in support,
including TV advertising, radio and print. American Express encouraged its
customers to use their American Express card as 1 cent was donated to the
restoration of the Statue of Liberty per transaction. For every new American
Express customer signup, a $1 donation was made. During this three-month
campaign, over $1.7 million was raised for the Restoration of the Statue of
Liberty, the use of American Express cards rose 28 percent the first month,
compared to the previous year, and new card applications swelled by 45 percent.
Since then, American Express has run over 90 programs in 17 different countries
(Adkins, 1999).
Since then, CRM has taken on many faces, some of which have been
catastrophic. For example, in April of 2010, KFC received considerable backlash
for its partnership with Susan G. Komen for the Cure. For each pink bucket of
chicken purchased, KFC donated 50 cents to the cause. Barbara Brenner,
executive director of Breast Cancer Action, went on to say that, “It sends a mixed
message. They are raising money for women’s health by selling a product that’s
bad for your health...it’s hypocrisy.” All this to say, there have been many
campaigns since 1983 that exhibit little rhyme or reason and some that clearly
make since both for the nonprofit and for-profit organization involved, although
the latter are few and far between.
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Because of the apparent lack of focus most CRM campaigns possess,
various stakeholders of the firm remain unconvinced that CRM is an appropriate
marketing technique. Iterating this point, Porter and Kramer (2006) suggest that
CRM is missing the mark of true “strategic philanthropy”, as it emphasizes
publicity rather than social impact and desires enhanced goodwill over an
improvement to compete more effectively. As will be discussed subsequently,
proper strategic philanthropy addresses important economic and social goals
concurrently, targeting specific areas of competitive settings where the company
and society both benefit from the firm’s unique assets, expertise and market
position. Therefore, the apparent disconnect between society and businesses
executives as to what constitutes appropriate social behavior of the firm has left
the development of CRM as a marketing communication tool in flux.
It is important to note that marketing studies, although not definitive, have
bent toward the notion that investors normally favor the announcement of
sponsorship investments (Deitz, Evans, and Hansen, 2012; Pruitt, Cornwell, and
Clark, 2004), although, the evidence relating to different types of sponsorship
(e.g., CRM) remain far from clear. Traditional sponsorships require substantial
costs and therefore, the announcement could very well signal the healthy
financial status of the company. Even so, it is important to understand that past
sponsorship scenarios have explored the relationship between two for-profit
organizations, and both organizations are motivated by profits. It is difficult to say
what the investment expectations are behind the current landscape of CRM
campaigns. What is easy to understand, and well documented, is that consumers
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and investors alike are increasingly skeptical of the practice because of the lack
of focus, strategic foresight and perceived altruism exhibited by the firm (Bronn
and Vrioni, 2001; Kim and Lee, 2009; Webb and Mohr, 1998). However, the key
word to emphasize here is “strategic”. This study suggests that firms engaging in
strategic philanthropic acts will favorably position themselves with investors and
consumers.
TACTICAL VS STRATEGIC CRM
Since its inception more than three decades ago, strategic philanthropy
has been underutilized as a management and marketing practice. Although this
concept has evolved from the general concept of corporate social responsibility,
its acceptance has fluctuated over time. Table 1 below provides information on
the evolution on corporate philanthropy in the United States. Strategic
philanthropy has been defined as, “The synergistic use of organizational core
competencies and resources to address key stakeholders’ interests and to
achieve both organizational and societal benefits” (Thorne McAlister and Ferrell,
2002). This concept revolves around the idea that employee needs and core
skills are integrated with organizational resources (e.g., equipment, knowledge
and financial) such that all relevant stakeholders benefit from these key assets.
AT&T was one of the first companies to formally use strategic philanthropy when
they appointed Reynold Levy to run its foundation. Levy’s creative thinking
changed the link between firm and societal needs by tying AT&T’s foundation
activities directly to business goals and objectives (Thorne McAlister and Ferrell,
2002). However, he was only able to accomplish this by insisting that such
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Table 1
Evolution of Corporate Philanthropy in the United States
Time Frame

General characteristics of philanthropy

Through 1950s

Federal law prohibits corporate donations

1960s and 1970s

Public begins to believe that companies should
donate some of their profits to societal causes
Large corporations set up foundations
Few criteria for choosing philanthropic projects

1970s and 1980s

Stagnant economy slows corporate philanthropy
Public and government lower expectations of
business
Merger and acquisition strategies leave little room for
philanthropic effort and donations

Early 1990s

Pressure to formalize corporate governance and
accountability
Public reacts to “greed” of 1980s by raising
expectations of business
Companies take more active role in community and
societal causes

Mid to late 1990s

Expansion of philanthropy model to include time and
human resources
Recognition of relationship between philanthropy and
corporate benefits with customers, employees,
business partners and community
Collaboration between business and other groups to
resolve social problems
Focus on aligning business goals with philanthropic
activity through overall corporate vision

Early 2000s and beyond

Philanthropic giving becomes unfocused
Little to no strategy behind social investments
Consumers becoming increasingly skeptical
Focus is on publicity and enhanced goodwill
Short-term motivation to satisfy shareholders and
community
_________________________________________________________________
Sources: Smith (1994); Svendsen (1998); Porter and Kramer (2002, 2006)
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activities could advance business interests. Other companies have followed the
lead of AT&T. For example, former CEO of Coca-Cola (i.e., Roberto Goizueta)
stated that, “By embracing a strategic approach to philanthropy, corporations
fulfill their responsibility to their shareholders and their commitment to the
community” (Saporta, 1997, p. 1).
All of this points to a common theme, namely that when firms align their
charitable contributions to their primary business focus, they can then draw on
the greater wealth of their firm’s people, information and resources (Lindquist,
1998). However, the majority of philanthropic activity by the firm bends toward
the contrary. The traditional approach, for example, is characterized by corporate
giving and associated activities that are not explicitly aligned with the strategic
goals and resources of the organization (Thorne McAlister and Ferrell, 2002).
Employees may in fact be encouraged to volunteer their time, but they do not
typically receive direction on where and how to spend it. There are specific cases
that iterate this point. Xerox employees in Connecticut are given one month to a
year off to pursue their social ambitions. Other companies require that their
employees spend a certain amount of time per week supporting social projects.
Moreover, some social projects are supported simply because management has
a personal interest. For example, Ben and Jerry’s gave 1 percent of its pre-tax
profits to programs supporting peace initiatives (Till and Nowak, 2000). Although
this type of corporate philanthropy utilizes well-intentioned practices, there is no
true integration throughout operations and strategic decision processes (Thorne
McAlister and Ferrell, 2002). Regrettably, this is the current state of modern
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CRM. As previously mentioned, corporate giving has evolved into a public image
consolidation project (for lack of a better phrase), rather than a strategic
operation, that aligns the social responsibilities of the firm with financial
responsibilities of the firm (Porter and Kramer, 2006). However, there are some
firms that have remained diligent, understanding they are best qualified to deal
with social issues that are conducive to their experience, knowledge, expertise
and available resources (Thorne McAlister and Ferrell, 2002). But practically,
what measures are those firms incorporating in order to, at the very least,
mitigate the skepticism surrounding the strategy so both the consumer and
financial markets understand there is rhyme and reason behind these specific
social investments?
Van der Brink et al. (2006) suggest the answer to this question may reside
in the differences between what they call strategic CRM and tactical CRM.
Strategic CRM consists of campaigns that are characterized by the involvement
of high senior management, a significant portion of invested firm resources, and
a long-term commitment of the firm toward the campaign and or cause
(Varadarajan and Menon, 1988). Alternatively, tactical CRM is characterized as
marketing activities that last for a brief period of time and has little employee
involvement (Drumwright and Murphy, 2001; Till and Nowak, 2000). Van der
Brink et al. (2006) suggest that strategic and tactical CRM differ on four
dimensions:
(1) The congruency between the cause and a company’s core
competency (Pracejus and Olsen, 2004).
(2) The duration of a campaign (Till and Nowak, 2000)
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(3) The amount of invested resources (Macleod, 2001; Welsh, 1999)
(4) The degree of senior management involvement (Varadarajan and
Menon, 1988)
According to van der Brink et al. (2006), CRM campaigns fall along a high-low
continuum for each of these four dimensions. The high endpoint parallels with
strategic CRM campaigns and the low endpoint with tactical CRM campaigns.
Van der Brink et al., (2006) also suggest each CRM program can have strategic
as well as tactical characteristics, and thus should not necessarily be categorized
as either strategic or tactical. However, this research contends that companies
should be wary of engaging in tactical CRM. Manifested through social
investments, companies send signals to both investors and consumers (i.e., the
market). The problem is that firms may inadvertently be sending negative signals
to invested stakeholders without even realizing it. This study explores what types
of signals corporations send to stakeholders when they choose to engage in
CRM initiatives. It is, therefore, all the more important to move toward a more
strategic form of philanthropy as consumers and investors are watching closely
to determine the financial and social legitimacy of these firms. After all, CRM was
one of the first terms to be coined “strategic philanthropy”.
CRM AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT
At its core, marketing strategy is the firm’s attempt to put firm resources at
risk in search for a differential competitive advantage. The relationship between
marketing strategy and such expenditures is of paramount importance for firm
success (Cook, 1985). This study suggests that one way firms have tried to

19

develop their marketing strategies is through their choice of marketing medium.
One such medium that has exploded over years is cause-related marketing.
Firms have increasingly utilized this communication tool in order to reach actual
and potential customers, while simultaneously providing unique resources to aid
a social cause. While firm expenditures have declined in traditional advertising
areas such as print, radio and television, and promotions, firm investments into
sponsorship in general and CRM in particular has continued to grow relative to
other marketing investments (IEG, 2015).
Keeping in line with the growth of CRM as a worthwhile marketing
investment tool by practitioners is the growth of CRM-related research. General
sponsorship, which includes CRM, has primarily focused on consumer-based
responses to the partnership, such as attitudes and purchase intentions (IEG
Sponsorship, 2015). More recent research, specifically in the sponsorship
literature, has moved into the realm of market-based responses through the
utilization of event study methodology (e.g., Clark et al., 2002; Cornwell, 2008).
However, there has been an obvious lack of market-based research concerning
CRM, which this study looks to rectify.
The choice of a firm to invest in a CRM campaign should be a strategic
decision. According to Cook (1985), the way in which firms choose to invest their
resources represents the basis for marketing strategy. Therefore, the fact that
strategic marketing investments implicate the allocation of company resources,
and those investments involve long-term financial planning, naturally suggests
that investment in CRM represents an unquestionably strategic activity.
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Moreover, the choice to enter specific markets or invest in strategic partnerships,
such as CRM alliances, is a strategic commitment on the part of the firm
(Srinivasan and Moorman, 2005). Cleary, investments in CRM should be, at least
in theory, designed with a strategic impetus.
While firm success may depend on strategic marketing investments, there
has been little research examining the market-based responses for firms
choosing to engage in specific marketing strategies. A potential cause for the
lack of research is that firm investment in strategic partnerships has been a
relatively discounted activity of the firm despite the fact that these types of
investments have the potential to provide favorable returns to the firm (Srinivasan
and Moorman, 2005). This is unfortunate because firm decisions have the
potential to influence not only customer-based reactions (Anderson, Fornell, and
Mazyancheryl, 2004), but also exhibit potential to impact market-based reactions.
Lastly, as stated previously, this research stream has provided
inconsistent consumer responses to CRM. Therefore, this study looks to
investor-based reactions to CRM not only to provide insight into the mixed results
of consumer reactions, but also because this type of research has lagged behind
for far too long. Recent pleas from senior marketing researchers (Reibstein, Day
and Wind, 2009; Hanssens, Rust and Srivastava, 2009), in conjunction with the
Marketing Science Institute’s (MSI’s) Marketing Strategy Meets Wall Street
research priority to treat “The investor community as a customer”, emphasizes
the imperative need to understand investor-based decision making and their
reaction to marketing initiatives such as CRM. The literature is heavily occupied
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with theoretical explanations for consumer-based reactions to CRM initiatives,
however little theoretical explanation has been provided for investor-based
reactions to these types of social investments. The following chapter gives a
potential explanation for investor-based reactions to CRM campaigns.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This section describes and develops the conceptual framework for the
relationships examined in this study. According to the hypotheses investigated
herein, firms engage in a strategic activity – in this case a CRM campaign –
which is hypothesized to have an effect on the firm’s financial metric of interest;
shareholder wealth. Below is the theoretical explanation of the processes by
which firms try utilize and leverage CRM in a manner that leads to improved
performance. We first, however, postulate how signaling should help explain the
investor-based responses to CRM campaigns. Signaling theory should provide a
basis for how new information – provided by firms to the market – is observed
and evaluated by the investment community.
SIGNALING THEORY
Signaling theory was originally developed to help explain how decisionmakers interpret and react to settings where information is incomplete and
disproportionately disseminated among parties (Spence, 1973). The premise of
the theory is that one organization has complete information while external
parties must rely on whatever information that organization is willing to share
(Nelson, 1970). This concept is also referred to as information asymmetry. Firm
leadership is exposed to both positive and negative private information, and it is
their job to filter which pieces of information will be disseminated to stakeholders.
Predominately, signaling theory has concentrated on the intentional
communication of positive information in order to communicate positive firm
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attributes (Connelly et al., 2011). However, firms also inadvertently and
unknowingly communicate negative information about specific firm attributes.
These negative signals (e.g., issuing new shares of the firm) are not generally
manifested in order to reduce information asymmetry, but are rather an
unintended consequence of the management actions (Connelly et al., 2011).
Furthermore, consumers identify observable characteristics (i.e., signals)
that affect the conditional probability of a product’s performance. Consumers do
this by acquiring relevant information with which purchase uncertainty can be
addressed in order to mitigate the perceived risk involved in the purchase
decisions process (Murray, 1991). Stakeholders of the firm view signals as ‘an
activity or attribute that, by design or accident, alters the beliefs or conveys
information to others’ (Spence, 1974).
Signals act as credible communicative transmitters of information from
producers to consumers (Spence, 2002), and for these signals to be effective,
they must satisfy two interconnected conditions. First, the signal needs to be
costly for the purpose of firm differentiation. Second, consumers must believe
that there is a positive correlation between the signal and the source’s underlying
quality (Stigler, 1961; Stiglitz, 1985). Another way to look at signals is that they
are only effective to the degree that consumers deem them both useful and
credible (Boulding and Kirmani, 1993). That is, consumers search for information
about firms and their products, but only as long as the effort or cost of doing the
search does not exceed the marginal expected return of the search. Advertising,
in the form of CRM, works as a signal because it minimizing the cost of search
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and reduces consumer ignorance (Stigler, 1961). However, when the credibility
of the signal is called into question, consumers are less likely to rely on it as an
important informational cue (Boulding and Kirmani, 1993).
Signals can take the shape in the actions or strategies employed by the
seller, such as product guarantees, price, advertising, brand equity, brand name,
and brand allies (Atkinson, 2014). Therefore, signals serve as visible market
actions of firms that communicate information about intentions, characteristics,
and resources of the firm (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). Interestingly, most firms
appear to be under the impression that the announcement of a CRM campaign
sends a single signal to stakeholders, and a positive one at that. But could firms
be inadvertently sending negative signals with their social investments? Are there
multiple dimensions to these campaigns that stakeholders consider? These are
empirical questions of keen interest to this research.
In addition to its usefulness in framing information asymmetries between
buyers and sellers, signaling theory provides a basis for predicting how the stock
market would react to the announcement of any major event, including a firm’s
decision to engage in social endeavors such as CRM. Specifically, when there is
an information asymmetry between managers and investors, investors use
signals sent from the firm and its leadership into order to make investment
decisions. To the extent that the announcement of CRM campaign by a publically
traded firm creates an information asymmetry for investors and other external
parties, the valence and quality of this signal should be quickly incorporated into
a firm’s stock price. Investors typically cannot observe the executive meetings in
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which such cause marketing investments are evaluated, nor are they necessarily
privy to the strategic motivations underlying a firm’s decision to partner with a
certain social cause. Based upon signaling theory, investors will seek cues in the
various signals associated with the cause announcement in order to better
understand the motivations of the social investment and reduce information
asymmetry. Prior research suggests that investors actively seek signals that
distinguish high and low quality marketing campaigns, as they provide insights
into future cash flows (Atkinson, 2014; Connelly et al., 2011). Collectively, if
investors of the firm feel that the CRM campaign will be beneficial and anticipate
a financial improvement to the performance of the firm, then the value of the firm
(i.e., stock price) should increase. However, the reverse of this logic is also true.
Lastly, investors react to firm announcements (i.e., new information) by
buying or selling stock according to how they perceive the new information
(Asquith and Mullins, 1986). More specifically, investors consider how new
information will be perceived by both the financial market and consumer market
(Ngobo et al., 2012). The aggregate evaluation of how the new information
impacts both markets is what determines a positive, negative or neutral
evaluation from the investment community. We now explore the importance of
shareholder value and why it has been widely considered to be a most effective
measure of market-based reactions to strategic marketing and financial decisions
by the firm.
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SHAREHOLDER VALUE
Nearly three decades ago, Day and Fahey (1988) noted the increasing
importance of incorporating new measures of firm performance that are
intimately linked to shareholder value:
Managers of diversified companies are rapidly replacing their usual
yardsticks of performance, such as market share, growth in sales, or
return on investment, with approaches that judge market strategies by
their abilities to enhance shareholder value (p. 45).
According to Day and Fahey (1988), the generative mechanism for integrating
the two perspectives was necessitated from the fact that the marketing
community was finding it difficult to identify, measure, and communicate the
financial value created by marketing activities of the firm. The marketing literature
is consistent with this line of thought. Specifically within the marketing-finance
literature, research has examined the influence of marketing actions and
decisions on shareholder wealth through investor-based reactions to marketing
activities such as celebrity endorsements (Agrawal and Kamakura, 1995),
sponsorship agreements (Deitz, Evans, and Hansen, 2013; Pruitt, Cornwell, and
Clark, 2004), green marketing strategies (Mathur and Mathur, 2000), corporate
social responsibility (Flammer, 2013; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Orlitzky,
2013), new product announcements (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha, 2007),
and firm innovation (Sood and Tellis, 2009). However, investor-based reactions
to CRM alliances have received very little, if any, attention at all.
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Furthermore, shareholder value has been widely considered to be the best
measure of market-based reactions to strategic marketing and financial decisions
by the firm (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey, 1998). Because shareholder value
is a function of firm stock price and number of shares outstanding, the
relationship between returns and shareholder wealth is such that increases in
stock prices – when multiplied by number of shares outstanding by the firm –
leads to increased shareholder value (Day and Fahey, 1988). We seek,
therefore, to make explicit the contribution of marketing activities to shareholder
value, advancing both the conceptual understanding of the marketing-finance
interface along with the assessment and measurement of the value created by
cause-related marketing.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In this section our primary hypothesis is developed which relates a firm’s
participation in CRM campaigns to shareholder wealth. We also argue that the
relationship between CRM announcements and firm market value may not be
universal, but rather contingent upon several boundary conditions. That is,
whether a positive or negative relationship is observed is dependent on several
of our hypothesized variables.
EFFECTS OF CRM ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
Although past studies of sponsorship effects on financial performance
have produced mixed results, sponsorship in general has been seen as a
positive investment tool between two for-profit entities whose central impetus is
profit maximization (Cornwell, 2008; Deitz, Evans, and Hansen, 2012).
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Unfortunately, CRM – a social sponsorship – has morphed into a marketing
communication tool that has little to do with the company’s long-term business
strategy (Porter and Kramer, 2006). In many instances, it is far more focused on
the short-term implications of the social endeavor. Thus, the majority of CRM
efforts fall directly into the tactical CRM model described by Van der Brink et al.
(2006), characterized by: short-term commitments, low fit between the firm and
the cause, unfocused and unrelated giving of resources, and little to no
involvement of executives and managers toward the campaign effort. Therefore,
it seems plausible that investors would respond in a negative manner if they
perceive CRM campaigns lack the strategic erudition necessary to garner a
reasonable return on investment. Davis (1960) suggested that a strategic lens
must be at the epicenter of social behavior if both the recipients of the donation
as well as investors are truly to benefit. From the outset, strategic giving has
attempted to address both social and economic goals simultaneously, targeting
areas of competitive context where the company and the cause both benefit
because the firm brings unique assets and expertise to the partnership
(Varadarajan and Menon, 1988). Unfortunately, most CRM strategies have
deviated away from this vision, focusing more on publicity and enhanced goodwill
(Porter and Kramer, 2006).
When CRM campaigns are announced, investors react to this information
by buying or selling stock according to how they perceive the new information
(Asquith and Mullins, 1986). Investors also take into account how they believe
other stakeholders – such as consumers – are likely to perceive the social
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investment (Ngobo et al., 2012). Therefore, the industry’s general emphasis on
tactical CRM (Porter and Kramer, 2006) should propagate an initial selloff, thus
producing a negative financial effect for those companies.
In summation, this study, suggests that, by and large, CRM campaigns
possess the posture of the elements that comprise tactical CRM (Van der Brink
et al. 2006), an approach that should send negative signals about the firm’s
broader marketing communications strategy, perceived commitment to the
investment, and genuine altruism toward the cause (Porter and Kramer, 2006).
We, therefore, suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Announcements of cause-related marketing campaigns will
produce negative abnormal stock market returns.
In the following sections, we argue that the relationship between CRM
announcements and firm market value may not be universally negative, but
rather contingent upon several boundary conditions. That is, whether a positive
or negative relationship is observed is dependent on several of our hypothesized
variables. The hypothesized investor-based response can be found in the
conceptual model for this study found in Figure 1 at the end of this section.
SPONSOR FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND MARKET RESPONSE TO
CAUSE-RELATED MARKETING ANNOUNCEMENTS
CORPORATE REPUTATION
The concept of corporate reputation has been of considerable interest in
the academic literature. While there has been a relative consensus among
practitioners and scholars that the public’s perception of a company determines
the company’s success (Brown, 1998; Fombrun, 1996; Tischer and Hildebrandt
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2011), it remains unclear, however, what it means to declare a company as
having a ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘poor’ or ‘solid’ reputation. Although a firm’s reputation may
be no more than an overall judgment of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Poiesz, 1989; Van Riel,
2004), most of the time, firm reputation is not unidimensional. Stakeholders
readily hold a variation of associations regarding a firm, which is most likely too
intricate to be totalized merely by ‘good’ or bad’.
Naturally, the definition of corporate reputation has become a fundamental
problem in the literature (Fombrun, 1996; Wartick, 2002), with recent articles
calling for a definitional consensus (Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty, 2006). To date,
there is a general acceptance that corporate reputation is a collective construct
that reflects an aggregated view of individual perceptions (Barnett, Jermier and
Lafferty, 2006; Walker, 2010). Boulstridge and Carrigan (2000) contend that
corporate reputation measurements must be focused on all relevant
stakeholders, both internal and external to the firm. Tischer and Hildebrandt
(2011), therefore, define overall corporate reputation as, “A relatively stable,
aggregated and indirectly suggestible perception within multiple stakeholder
groups based on a company’s past actions and future prospects in comparison to
some reference”.
Although in the past, because access to multiple stakeholders of the firm
was difficult, many researchers were forced to find ways to empirically justify that
corporate reputation between various stakeholder groups were comparable
(Eberl and Schwaiger, 2005). Subsequent studies (e.g., Tischer and Hildebrandt,
2011; Walker, 2010) have used this theoretical approach to assume that
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corporate reputation within one stakeholder group is in general an indication of
others. However, this study argues that one would be hard pressed to assume
that investors, for example, evaluate a corporation’s reputation in the same
manner as consumers.
In an attempt to circumvent this problem, organizations such as Fortune
have developed reputation quotients comprised of various stakeholder
perceptions of specific corporate reputations. With well over a decade of
experience in the field, Fortune has consistently turned corporate reputation
measurement into a science based on one simple concept: stakeholder
perception is a corporation’s reputation. This approach has, at least, partially
taken away the ambiguity that has previously hindered this construct, therefore
producing the potential for a more reliable investigation into the impact corporate
reputation has on financial outcomes for the firm.
More importantly for this study, a corporation’s reputation can operate as a
signal for individuals without direct experience with the firm (Kazoleas, Kim and
Moffitt, 2001; Sabate and Puente, 2003; Spence, 1974). In other words,
reputation can be used as a risk-reducing mechanism or cue for stakeholders of
the firm (Kotha, Rajgopal and Rindova, 2001), in that they will trust and depend
on companies that exhibit stronger reputations. A firm’s reputation unequivocally
reduces information asymmetry by providing clues into the quality and integrity of
the firm and its investment decisions (Houston, 2003; Rao, 1994; Weigelt and
Camerer, 1988). Thus, the investment community is likely to depend on an
observable and costly signal such as reputation in order to evaluate the
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announcement of an investment, which for this study is a cause-related
marketing campaign. Moreover, when companies possess weak reputations and
choose to engage in CRM campaigns, these initiatives could very well signal a
lack legitimacy and desperation (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). The weaker the
legitimacy of the firm, the more the firm will make efforts to enhance it, which has
been shown to produce even more skepticism from the various stakeholders of
the firm (Elving, 2013).
The investment community, which is a primary stakeholder of the firm, is
likely to depend on an observable and costly signal such as reputation in order to
evaluate the announcement of any investment (Bergh and Gibbons, 2011).
Reputation should be equally if not more relevant to this conclusion concerning
the controversial nature of social investments, such as CRM. In addition, it has
been shown that a favorable corporate reputation can improve the competitive
situation of the firm by positively influencing different stakeholder groups (Barney
1991). However, this effect is claimed by some researchers to be the other way
around (Sabate and Puente, 2003). This study focuses on the former, with
reputation being the trigger for positive effects on financial performance through
investment decision-making by the firm (Dunbar and Schwalbach, 2000; Eberl
and Schwaiger, 2005; Srivastava, Shirvani, and Fahey, 1998).
The idea that corporate reputation acts as a trigger for positive effects on
financial performance fits nicely within the market-based assets framework
presented by Srivastava, Shirvani, and Fahey (1998). An asset can be defined
broadly as any physical, organizational, or human attribute that enables the firm
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to generate and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and
effectiveness in the marketplace (Barney, 1991). But does a corporation’s
reputation contribute to winning strategies or a real competitive advantage in a
prolonged marketplace rivalry? Does it have the ability to generate and sustain
value for customers and investors of the firm? Srivastava, Shirvani, and Fahey
(1998) stipulate that in order for a market-based asset to contribute to customer
and financial value, it must satisfy four tests to some extent:
1. It is convertible: If the firm can use the asset to exploit an opportunity
and/or neutralize a threat in the external environment, then the potential to
create and sustain value is enhanced.
2. It is rare: If multiple rivals possess the asset, its potential to be a source
of sustainable value is diminished.
3. It is imperfectly imitable: If it is difficult for rivals to imitate the asset, the
potential to sustain value is enhanced.
4. It does not have perfect substitutes: If rivals do not possess strategically
equivalent convertible assets and it is difficult to develop them, then the
potential to sustain value is enhanced.
Reputation, as a market-based asset, passes this litmus test and should increase
shareholder value by enhancing cash flows, accelerating future cash flows, and
reducing risk associated with future cash flows (Srivastava, Shirvani, and Fahey,
1998). Based on said justification, we suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The abnormal stock market returns for firms announcing
CRM campaigns will be positively associated with
corporate reputation.
CASH FLOW
By definition, firm value is the discounted value of the cash flows
distributed by the firm to its security holders. Therefore, it has been proposed that
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a firm’s marketing activities must be linked to its cash flows in some form or
fashion (Anderson 1982; Day and Fahey 1988; Doyle 2000; Rust et al., 2004).
Moreover, various scholars have also posited that there are several links among
marketing activities, cash flows, and performance (Rust et al., 2004; Srivastava,
Shervani, and Fahey, 1998). However, the great assumption here – and why
cash flow is of importance to this study – is that greater cash flow leads to a
distribution of those monies to shareholders, which ultimately determines firm
value (i.e., stock price) and the wealth created for shareholders (Rappaport,
1986).
This assumption has been explored by several scholars who found that
greater cash flow generated by a firm’s customer portfolio is capable of
supplementing shareholder wealth (Gupta and Lehmann, 2003; Rust et al.,
2004). Furthermore, companies exhibiting greater amounts of cash flow should
naturally signal a greater financial health of the company relative to companies
exhibiting lower amounts of cash flow. The presence of greater amounts of cash
flow should also help alleviate the perceived risk of corporate investments (Rao
and Bharadwaj, 2008), especially ones as controversial as CRM. Ultimately,
firms engaging in social investments should be able to justify these expenditures
more easily to investors as long as they are able to signal the financial health of
their organization through the presence of cash flows.
From the stock market’s perspective, companies exhibiting healthier
financials (e.g., cash flow) during the announcement of a CRM campaign could
likely engender the following reaction. A greater financial performance record
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may create a positive halo effect, which could provide a stable source for
investors to give the firm the benefit of the doubt that might accompany the
announcement of a CRM campaign (Bergh and Gibbons, 2011). In other words,
the perception could be that firms with greater amounts of cash flow have been
successful before, so they likely will capitalize on their financial character benefit,
at least in the short term. A healthier cash flow situation for a firm should provide
a signal to investors that managers and executives of the firm see CRM
investments as commitments to further improving the various elements that could
lead to an even higher performance outcome for the firm (Bergh and Gibbons,
2011). Ultimately, firms engaging in social investments should be able to justify
these expenditures more easily to investors as long as they are able to signal the
financial health of their organization through the presence of cash flows.
Alternatively, companies exhibiting lower amounts of cash flow still
choosing to publically announce and promote their CRM efforts may be
conveying desperation, thus deepening suspicions surrounding the investment. If
this is the case, the stock market may react to the announcement of CRM
campaigns negatively, inferring poor investment decisions, eroding competitive
advantages, and/or difficulties with strategic executions (Amit and Schoemaker,
1993; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Therefore, the perception is that companies
with greater amounts of cash flow will see more profitability either because of
operations efficiencies or efficiencies in managing assets and investments
(Bergh and Gibbons, 2011). This knowledge and understanding of cash flow
leads naturally to the following hypothesis:

36

Hypothesis 3: The abnormal stock market returns for firms announcing
CRM campaigns will be positively associated with cash
flow.
MARKET SHARE
Consumers and investors pay attention to market shares of various firms
as they make their respective market decisions (Ghosh, 2004). Market share
provides an additional source of information, ultimately signaling pivotal quality
differences between firms in the minds of relevant stakeholders (Caminal and
Vives, 1996). Firms also compete for greater market share because they try
desperately to manipulate how consumers view the market in which they
compete (Caminal and Vives, 1996). Another well noted motivation for increased
market share is that firms can exploit increasing economies of scale. Buzzell and
Gale (1987) also claim that “the effects of economies of scale represent the
direct causal mechanism that links market share to profitability”. Ghosh (2004)
suggest another reason for the link between market share and performance may
be explained by risk averse buyers that favor firms exhibiting larger market
shares, as those buyers may feel more assured about the products of more
prominent firms. Lastly, increased market share has been shown to increase
productivity through better asset management and/or superior investment
decisions (Ghosh, 2004). Therefore, firms with larger market shares should see
greater profitability either by operational efficiencies or asset management
efficiencies and ultimately the investments made by the firm. Greater market
share should, therefore, send positive signals to the both the financial and
consumer markets.
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Furthermore, a greater presence in the market may also create a positive
halo effect, which provides investors the confidence they need to evaluate the
announcement of a CRM campaign. In other words, the perception could be that
firms exhibiting a greater presence are undoubtedly successful in what they do,
and therefore the risk involved in their CRM efforts may be mitigated relative to
their competitors (Bergh and Gibbons, 2011). Moreover, a greater presence a
firm demonstrates in the market should provide investors the impression that
managers and executives of the firm see CRM investments as commitments to
further improving the various aspects of the firm’s long-term goals, which could
lead to an even greater market presence for the future.
Alternatively, firms exhibiting a weaker presence in the market still desiring
to engage in CRM may be inadvertently signaling the need to legitimize the firm,
thus producing more skepticism into the market concerning that particular firm’s
CRM investments (Elving, 2013). If this is the case, the stock market may
negatively react to the announcement of CRM campaigns, inferring poor
investment decisions, eroding competitive advantages, and/or difficulties with
strategic executions (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).
Therefore, the perception is that companies with larger market shares see more
profitability either because of firm operational efficiencies or efficiencies in
managing assets and investments by the firm (Bergh and Gibbons, 2011).
Hypothesis 4: The abnormal stock market returns for firms announcing
CRM campaigns will be positively associated with market
share.
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NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS AND MARKET
REPSONSE TO CAUSE-RELATED MARKETING ANNOUNCEMENTS
NONPROFIT GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCE DEPENDENCE
Within the nonprofit literature, there is a growing interest in how nonprofit
organizations acquire their resources. The primary sources of nonprofit revenue
allocation come from (1) private contributors, (2) public support (i.e., government
grants), and (3) private sector payments (i.e., commercial activity). The
fundamental assertion of resource dependency theory is simply that, “The key to
organizational survival is the ability to acquire and maintain resources” (Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978). Nonprofit organizations do not have all the necessary
resources to bring their missions to full fruition. They must look to other entities to
fulfill organizational vacancies by forming partnerships (Davis and Cobb, 2010;
Heimovics et al., 1993; Oliver, 1991; Selsky and Parker, 2005). In other words,
nonprofit organizations are not perfectly autonomous entities pursuing desired
ends at their own discretion. They are organizations that are inhibited by the
environment as a consequence of their resource needs. Therefore, the degree of
dependence experienced by nonprofit organizations is determined by the
importance and concentration of resources provided by various donors. Nonprofit
organizations that rely on few entities for their vital resources become highly
dependent on and indebted to those providers in order to survive.
One such entity that many nonprofit organizations are increasingly
dependent upon for survival is government. The problem here is that there is a
fear – legitimate or not – that increased reliance on government funding is
causing nonprofit organizations to compromise their values, vision, mission and
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relationships as they inevitably become more dependent on earmarked funds
(Lister, 2003). And make no mistake; resources given to nonprofit organizations
are given with certain expectations. A traditional African proverb puts this
problem into perspective stating, “If you have your hand in another man’s pocket
you must move when he moves”. Nonprofit organizations that accumulate funds
from a multitude or sources do not face the same dilemmas concerning their
mission and values (Froelich, 1999). The relationship between nonprofit
organizations and government has already been muddled in politics. For
example there has been a widespread and public uproar with how nonprofit
organizations are contributing to political campaigns with an, “I’ll scratch your
back if you scratch mine” type of exchange. More money is being spent on TV
advertising in presidential races by social welfare nonprofits than by any other
type of independent group (http://www.propublica.org).
Furthermore, it has been said that a nonprofit’s ability to adapt, maintain
its mission, and ultimately remain a healthy alternative for businesses seeking
alliances is contingent upon a nonprofit’s ability to garner individual, long-term
support from the masses (Froelich, 1999). The reason this is of importance is
that attitudes toward one object have been shown to “spill over” onto other
associated objects (Simonin and Ruth, 1998). Therefore, firms partnering with
nonprofits that do not exhibit a certain stamp of approval from the masses
because of their heavy resource dependence on few sources (e.g., government),
in theory, should receive negative spillover effects on firm value (i.e., stock price).
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This research, therefore, contends that to the extent that firms partner with
nonprofits that depend heavily on government resources as the primary source of
revenue, negative signals are sent to consumers and investors that the firm is
aligning itself with causes that are not capable of maintaining their mission and
values. In other words, the perception is that partnering with causes that are
funded by the masses will have a positive spillover effect on the sponsoring firm.
We therefore suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The abnormal stock market returns for firms announcing
CRM campaigns will be negatively associated with nonprofit
governmental resource dependence.
SPONSOR-NONPROFIT RELATIONSHIP ATTRIBUTES AND MARKET
RESPONSE TO CAUSE-RELATED MARKETING ANNOUNCEMENTS
IN-KIND DONATIONS
For a few decades, firm utilization of various CRM strategies has been of
significant interest to researchers (Alcorn, 1991; Gupta and Pirsch, 2006).
Strategies have ranged from traditional sponsorship, transaction-based, joint
promotion, in-kind contributions and many others that are included in Table 2
(Berglind and Nakata, 2005; Gupta and Pirsch, 2006). This study investigates the
impact that in-kind donations have on shareholder wealth.
In-kind donations refer to a non-financial contribution by the firm toward a
social cause. An in-kind donation is perceived by the public at its full market
value, but only impacts the firm’s financials based on its cost to produce or
deliver (Islam and Vande, 2013). It has also been found that an in-kind gift’s
market value is typically more than double the value of a cash donation because
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Table 2
CRM Strategies
_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Strategy

Description

Example

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
The Proud Supporter Method

A company gives a flat donation to a cause.
The donation is not tied to sales of a product
or action by the consumer.

General Mills Pink Together

Donating with Purchase

Possibly the most common approach associated
with cause-related promotions. A donation is
triggered for each specially marked package sold
during a pre-determined timeframe. The donation
may vary and may be described in terms of a
percentage or dollar amount of each product. A
funding cap is usually associated with this campaign.

Betty Crocker Stirring
up Wishes

Donation with Redemption

A company makes a donation for every code/label
provided through purchase and redeemed in-store
or via mail. It is not the sale itself, which triggers
the donation, but the supplemental action.

Yoplait Save Lids to Save
Lives

Donation Online Activation

A company makes a donation for every code/label
through purchase and redeemed or activated
online.

Dawn Saves Wildlife

Donation with Action

A method that does not require a purchase. A
company makes a donation when the consumer
takes a specific action (e.g., sends a viral gift,
hosts an event, designs packaging.

Mike’s Hard Lemonade
Share Some Pink

Dual Incentive Method

A company provides an incentive to drive
consumer donations (e.g., a donation match,
a product coupon or discount).

Lands End Big Warm Up

Consumer Pledge Drive

Companies encourage consumers to pledge
support to a social cause. This is often
accompanied by a corporate donation or
incentive for each pledge.

Starbucks Pledge5

Buy One, Give one Method

A donation by a company is communicated in
terms of a comparable social impact (e.g., one
pack = one vaccine; one dollar = one tree
planted, one pair of shoes bought = one pair
of shoes donated).

Pampers’ 1 Pack = 1 Vaccine

Consumer-Directed Donation

This promotion allows consumers to determine
where and how a company’s donation is
accumulated, either from a set list or by
“nominating” favorite charities.

Target Bullseye Gives

Volunteerism Rally

This promotion encourages consumers to donate
time in support of a social cause. They are rewarded
for their volunteerism with complimentary goods and
or services.

Disney’s Give a Day, Get a
Disney Day

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Adopted from Research and Insights (2010)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3
Example of In-kind donation vs. Cash Donation
________________________________________________________________
In-kind Donation Cash Equivalent
________________________________________________________________
1. Fair Market Value
$1000
$1000
2. Basis (Cost of Goods Sold)
$500
$1000
3. Gross Margin (1-2)
$500
$0
4. 2 X Basis
$1000
N.A.
5. Basis + ½ Gross Margin
$750
N.A.
6. Tax deductible amount
$750
$1000
7. Tax deduction (at 30% tax rate)
$225
$300
8. Net cost to the company (2-7)
$275
$700
________________________________________________________________
the cost of the gift is the product’s marginal costs (Hellenius and Rudbeck, 2003).
For example, a firm that has a gross margin of 50% has the ability to donate
$1000 worth of goods at a cost of $500. On the other hand, a $1000 cash
donation costs the firm $1000. Moreover, according to the U.S. tax code IRC
170(e)(3), in-kind donations are also eligible for enhanced tax benefits (donations
of professional services or employee time do not qualify for enhanced deduction)
so long as the donation:
• Is used solely for the care of the ill, the needy, or infants, and in a manner
related to the giver’s exempt purpose;
• Is not transferred by the user in exchange for money, property, or service
• Satisfies requirements of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
Firms meeting those requirements are indeed eligible for tax deductions that
exceed the basis or cost of the goods up to twice the basis or the basis plus onehalf of the “gross margin” or difference between the market value and the cost,
whichever is less. To clarify, qualifying donations generate deductions, not
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credits. Taxes owed are not reduced. The income on which tax is owed is
reduced. Their final impact on net operating profits after taxes (NOPAT) will
depend on the firm’s tax rate. Table 3 above provides a detailed example, and
illustrates how, by donating products, the firm can enjoy the publicity and other
benefits associated with in-kind donations at a fraction of the cost.
The strategies mentioned in Table 2 fall into two broad categories:
instrumental centered logic (e.g., sponsorship, transaction-based, joint
promotion) and relational centered logic (e.g., in-kind contribution) (Liu, 2013).
Under the instrumental centered logic of CRM, executives view CRM-related
spending as an investment tool and put too much focus on the commercial value
of such a strategy (Trimble and Rifon, 2006; Varadarajan and Menon, 1988). The
relational centered logic emphasizes connecting the campaign to the
stakeholders’ expectations of the firm. According to Liston-Heyes and Liu (2010),
firms should always utilize CRM in a way that manages its relationships with its
significant stakeholder groups. The reason being is that this approach enables
the firm to establish its legitimacy through its CRM efforts. Although managers
may feel an instrumental centered logic is preferable to investors, one could
argue that building relationships through in-kind giving, not only stimulates
consumer confidence in firm motives, but also mitigates the immediate financial
strain on the firm’s bottom line, something that shareholders undoubtedly
appreciate.
Furthermore, research suggests that the effects of CRM on firm
performance will suffer if it is perceived that the firm is not helping as much as it
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needs to, is able to, or in the way that it should (Andreasen, 1996; Bird, 1998;
Suter et al., 2015). In other words, consumers should be more favorably
predisposed towards in-kind, relational centered CRM strategies (Liu, 2013). It is
likely that in-kind strategies generate perceptions among consumers that the firm
involved exerted extra effort in helping the cause. According to Morales (2005),
consumers are more than willing to reward firms for extra effort and planning of
social initiatives. Empirical support for this position can be found in the behavioral
decision theories, which posit that effort directed toward a stimulus is
psychologically differentiated from equivalent amounts spent using money (Reed,
Aquino, and Levy, 2007). Our society values doing more than writing a check,
since exerting effort triggers different motivations than simply giving money. For
example, Webley and Wilson (1989) found that money is not a universally
acceptable exchange medium, and suggest that the major reasons for the
unacceptability of monetary resources as a gift have a relationship with the time
and effort that should be present. Therefore, positive signals should be sent from
the sponsoring firm to the consumer when extra effort is involved. A practical
example of this occurred when Oakley Sunglasses received $41 million worth of
media exposure for their donation of 35 pairs of special sunglasses to the
Chilean miners to protect their eyes after they were rescued from the mine.
Additionally, with skepticism of CRM as a marketing communication tool at
an all time high, firms should seek to signal a genuine altruism to consumers and
evidence of strategic planning to investors (Till and Nowak, 2000; Liu and Ko,
2011). Firms opting to give in-kind donations to a social cause have the
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opportunity to do just that. The rationale behind firms choosing to partner with
social causes that are capable of receiving in-kind donations is that firms cannot
very well donate product or human resources, for example, to the cause if there
is not a similarity or apparent link between the two organizations (Folse et al.,
2014). Therefore, companies that are able to utilize in-kind donations as a means
of corporate giving may be signaling a high-perceived fit between themselves
and the nonprofit. High fit perceived through the lens of in-kind donations may
help clarify some of the discrepancies in the literature concerning the fit between
the firm and the cause.
Lastly, as previously stated, signals sent to the consumer market are
taken into account by the financial market when reacting to new information
(Ngobo et al., 2012), which in this case are CRM announcements. Therefore,
utilizing in-kind donations should send positive signals of a genuine altruism to
consumers and a strategic marketing plan and a commitment to long-term
financial goals to investors (Van den Brink et al., 2006). This study contends that
consumers and investors alike should develop positive associations around inkind donations by the firm toward a social cause. Therefore, the following
hypothesis is suggested:
Hypothesis 6: The abnormal stock market returns of firms announcing
CRM campaigns will be positively associated with any type
of in-kind donation.
CAMPAIGN DURATION
Many scholars have explored the importance of commitment between
business entities in a number of different ways including social exchange
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theories (Cook and Emerson, 1978), marriage theories (Thompson and Spanier,
1983), and organizational theories (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Morgan and
Hunt, 1994; Palmatier et al., 2009). Dwyer, Shurr, and Oh (1987) looked at
differences between discrete and relational transactions to better understand
commitment. Discrete transactions have a ‘distinct beginning, short duration, and
sharp ending’ while relational exchanges exhibit ‘traces to pervious agreements
[and]...is longer in duration, reflecting an ongoing process’. Moreover, most
scholars agree that commitment to another party is reflected by one organization
believing that the relationship necessitates the highest efforts to maintaining it. In
other words, the party initiating commitment believes the relationship is worth
cultivating to guarantee that it endures (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).
CRM relationships are no different. Within this context, it has been
suggested that companies should show a certain degree of commitment toward
the CRM campaign in order to reap brand loyalty from consumers (Miller, 2002).
One of the factors that can demonstrate a company’s commitment is the duration
of the CRM program. Till and Nowak (2000) suggest that the actual effectiveness
of a CRM program increases with its duration. They suggest that repeated
pairings of organizations from the past or anticipated repeated pairings in the
future will help strengthen the link between the two organizations. This concept is
also known as “signal learning” because one organization provides a signal
concerning the presence of the other organization. Varadarajan and Menon
(1988) state that CRM campaigns with a medium to long-term focus have a
higher potential of increasing consumers’ perceptions of company image.
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Moreover, advertising campaigns with a social connotation are more likely to be
successful with a longer time commitment (Drumwright, 1996). Van den Brink et
al. (2006) also found that the duration of the campaign had a significant impact
on firm outcomes. Specifically, their research suggests that the duration of the
campaign signals strategy, planning and foresight, elements that are vital for
investors as they evaluate these types of investments.
As has been previously stated, the duration of a CRM campaign can
signal the commitment level of the firm to the social cause (Till and Nowak,
2000). The reason this is of importance is that commitment has been shown to
lead to increases in brand loyalty (Miller, 2002) and company image
(Varadarajan and Menon, 1988). Therefore, consumers perceive increased
duration of CRM campaigns as a positive signal sent by the firm. Consumers
may in fact become skeptical and develop negative associations if campaigns
take place for a short time, as firm motives could be perceived as less than
wholly altruistic, concerned only with short-term profits (Varadarajan and Menon,
1988). Moreover, Till and Nowak (2000) suggest that firms demonstrating a lack
of perceived commitment to a cause signal to investors a lack of strategic
foresight to the brand’s long-term marketing plan. Empirically, Woolridge and
Snow (1990) confirmed that the stock market reacts positively to long-term
investments. Van der Brink et al. (2006) also suggest that firms should stay away
from short-term campaigns if they want to operate in the interest of both their
shareholders and customers. Therefore, the following hypothesis is suggested:
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Hypothesis 7: The abnormal stock market returns of firms announcing
CRM campaigns will be negatively associated with
campaign duration.
INTERACTION EFFECTS
In this section, we argue that the relationship between reputation and
cumulative abnormal returns may not be linear, but rather contingent on both the
firm’s use of in-kind donations toward a cause and partnering with nonprofit
organizations that rely heavily on governmental resources for survival.
CORPORATE REPUTATION AND IN-KIND DONATIONS
We expect that firms with weaker reputations will generate more positive
abnormal stock returns from in-kind donations given by the firm relative to firms
with stronger reputations. Because the market currently maintains a skeptical
posture toward the social behavior of for-profit organizations, firms exhibiting
weaker reputations must execute these types of investments flawlessly relative to
firms exhibiting stronger reputations. The reason being is that investors trust the
investments of companies with stronger reputations relative to those with weaker
ones (Elving, 2013). Furthermore, Pirsch and Gupta (2006) suggest something
that would imply in-kind donations and reputation are essential ingredients for
both CRM success and alleviating skepticism:
Marketing managers should focus on the basics when developing a
cause-related marketing campaign: build a general positive feeling toward
their brand, pick a cause that makes sense to the consumer to be a
partner in the alliance, and make sure that the consumer does not think
that your company is exploiting the alliance (p. 323).
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As aforementioned, when companies possess weak reputations and choose to
engage in CRM campaigns, these initiatives can be seen as the company trying
to increase reputation (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). The weaker the reputation of
the firm, the more the firm will try to strengthen it, which produces more
skepticism in the minds of the various stakeholders of the firm (Elving, 2013). To
avoid being caught in this vicious cycle, companies with weaker corporate
reputations engaging in CRM must be perfect in their execution. In other words,
firms with weaker reputations to do not have the luxury of making a mistake. In
order to accomplish this, firms with weaker reputations must partner with causes
that fit with their core business, which should provide clues into the quality,
integrity and intention of the firm’s investment (Houston, 2003; Rao, 1994;
Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). Because this study hypothesized that investors
prefer to see in-kind donations, firms with weaker reputations choosing to utilize
an in-kind strategy should see a greater positive reaction because they are acting
“out of character” so to speak. We anticipate this effect because organizations
exhibiting weaker characteristics have more to gain than organizations exhibiting
stronger characteristics when they act in a favorable way (Nowak and Washburn,
2000). Firms already exhibiting stronger reputations should not expect as strong
of an effect because they are acting as they should. Therefore, the following
hypothesis is suggested:
Hypothesis 8: Corporate reputation negatively moderates the relationship
between in-kind donations and abnormal stock market
returns. The relationship between in-kind donations and
abnormal stock market returns will be larger for firms with
weaker corporate reputations and smaller for firms with
stronger corporate reputations.
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CORPORATE REPUTATION AND NONPROFIT GOVERNMENTAL
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE
We also expect firms with weaker reputations to generate more negative
abnormal stock returns from partnerships with nonprofits receiving a significant
amount of funding from governmental grants relative to firms with stronger
reputations. We expect this result for the following reason. Although it is not yet
clear which corporate associations dominate firm reputation, there is no question
that there is an element of trust that accompanies the measurement, evaluation
and perception of a firm’s reputation (Berens and van Riel, 2004; Elving, 2013).
In other words, stronger corporate reputations exhibit greater amounts of
perceived trust from invested stakeholders. A nonprofit’s reputation is also linked
to perceived trustworthiness of that nonprofit (Bryce, 2007). A nonprofit’s ability
to gain individual donor support and self-financing is what provides a nonprofit
with its perceived trustworthiness by the masses (Bratton, 1990; Bryce, 2007;
Lefroy and Tsarenko, 2013). Therefore, nonprofits heavily reliant on
governmental grants should possess a weaker perceived reputation. A
nonprofit’s ability to adapt, maintain its mission, and ultimately remain a healthy
alternative for businesses seeking cause-marketing alliances is contingent upon
these elements (Froelich, 1999). Firms with weaker reputations cannot afford the
negative spillover that heavily governmentally funded nonprofit organizations
bring to the table (Simonin and Ruth, 1998). In other words, firms with weaker
reputations cannot afford to partner with nonprofit organizations that struggle with
their own stamp of approval (i.e., reputations) from the masses. Although in
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general, there should be a negative effect from partnering with nonprofit
organizations that receive a significant portion of their revenue from
governmental sources, the effect should be greater for firms that are perceived to
be less reputable. Therefore, the final hypothesis of this study suggests:
Hypothesis 9: Corporate Reputation positively moderates the relationship
between nonprofit governmental resource dependence and
abnormal stock market returns. The negative relationship
between nonprofit governmental resource dependence and
abnormal stock returns will be larger for firms with weaker
reputations and smaller for firms with stronger reputations.
We now turn to a thorough review of the event study methodology, how it
has been utilized in the past, and how the current research uses the
methodology. This segment of the study also highlights exactly how event
studies estimate market reactions to the announcement of a major corporate
event. This segment also outlines several theoretical assumptions and research
design issues that afford validity to event study analyses, and discusses
statistical and inferential issues that should alleviate any uncertainties that
naturally follow the exploration of an event study.
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FIGURE 1
Factors Influencing Shareholder Returns Associated with Cause-related
Marketing Announcements
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CHAPTER FOUR
Methodology
Event Study Methodology
Used extensively in the finance and accounting literature, the event study
method measures the effect of an unanticipated event on stock prices. The
standard approach uses a regression model to predict expected returns for the
firm based upon some period preceding the event. Abnormal returns (i.e.,
residuals) are the difference between the returns observed and those that the
regression model predicts. These abnormal returns may then be aggregated
across firms and over time. A variety of statistical tests are available to determine
whether the abnormal returns are significant in relation to the market model, and
if so, for how long (Henderson, 1990). Use of event study methodology precludes
the need to analyze accounting-based measures of profit, which critics say are
often not very good indicators of the true performance of firms (Orlitzky, 2013).
However, stock prices theoretically reflect the true value of firms because they
presumably reflect the discounted value of all future cash flows and incorporate
all relevant information. Therefore, this methodology has become a useful tool for
assessing the net economic value of any corporate event for which precise
announcement dates may be obtained (Cornwell et al., 2005; McWilliams and
Siegel, 1997; Pruitt et al., 2004).
Given that this method increasingly assesses the impact of managerial
decision-making in marketing and management, considerations of correct
implementation, clear reporting of results and appropriate interpretation of results
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are important. Readers can be confident that the conclusions from an event
study are valid only if (a) they know that the researcher has truly identified
abnormal returns associated with the event, and; (b) the conventional statistics
used to test significance do not depart from their theoretical unit normal
distribution under the null hypothesis (Campbell and Wasley, 1993). That is, the
analysis must be consistent with both the theoretical and statistical assumptions
underlying the technique.
ESTIMATING MARKET REACTIONS
The statistical procedure that was employed in the production of the stock
market results for this study is known as the Scholes-Williams standardized
cross-sectional market model. Three separate parameter-estimating regressions
between the stock market index – in this case the University of Chicago’s
computerized Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted
index of all stocks in the database – and the stock prices of each company was
conducted, relative to the first day-of-trading date following each CRM
announcement. The combined results of these regressions— both a slope and
an intercept—were then used in combination with actual changes in the CRSP
market index in order to estimate expected stock changes for each firm.
Deviations from the normal or expected returns of a stock that are visibly
attributable to new information exposed to the market reflect market reactions to
announcements of CRM campaigns. Abnormal changes, such as these, reflect
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deviations of a firm’s returns from its previous patterns of returns (Brown and
Warner, 1985). The expected return on a firm’s stock for the study period was
defined by:
Rit = Ai + Bi X Rmt,
where,
Rit = expected (normal) returns on stock i including dividends at time (day) t,
Ai = the intercept specific to firm i,
Bi, = the regression coefficient specific to firm i (systematic risk), and
Rmt = the equal-weighted market return for the corresponding day t.
The abnormal returns reflecting the market reaction to new information
released about a firm are estimated by ARit = Rit (actual) – Rit (expected). The
statistic of paramount importance, which reflects the net reaction of the market
due to the CRM announcement, is the cumulative effect of the announcement of
stock returns. The cumulative abnormal return on day t (CARt), after a CRM
campaign announcement, reflects the net change in returns over the period
beginning with t0 days before the event and ending t days after it (Frideman and
Singh, 1989).
THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS
The conclusions inferred from this type of analysis can be viewed with
confidence as long as the researcher has truly identified the abnormal returns
associated with the event. From a theoretical perspective, inference based on
event study methodology relies upon three key assumptions: the market is
efficient, there are no confounding events, and the event was unanticipated by
investors (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). If these assumptions are not satisfied,
inferences made from an event study analysis should not be accepted cautiously.
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The first assumption suggests that stock prices encompass all relevant
information that is available to investors, and it provides the very basis for
empirical utilization of the event study method. If this assumption is true, any
newly revealed, financially relevant information will be instantaneously reflected
in the stock price. Therefore, an event is defined as anything that results in new
information for investors to evaluate. Furthermore, researchers can readily
identify significant events by how those events impact the stock prices of the firm.
In order to do this, researchers must define a specific period of days over which
the impact of the event can be measured (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Lastly,
this assumption is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile if researchers insist on
utilizing longer event windows. Readers should be able to infer that researchers
using longer windows for analysis do not believe that the effects of events are
quickly incorporated into stock prices, which violates the first assumption.
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) give well documented examples of studies using
long event windows, which include days -10 to +10, -30 to +10, -50 to +10, -50 to
+49, and even -90 to +90. It should, however, be noted that it may be reasonable
to assume that information is at times gradually revealed to investors over a
period of time. For example, the initial announcement of an investment by the
firm may not provide all the necessary details that investors need for evaluation;
they may be provided over time. If this is the case, then it is the responsibility of
the researcher to justify why the effect would not be realized instantaneously.
The second assumption is that the central research point (i.e., the event)
is the only event that has significant influence on any stock price change. In other
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words, this assumption is based on the claim that the researcher has isolated the
effect of the event, and therefore no other event can be attributable to a change
in stock price. This is perhaps the most paramount assumption of the event study
methodology. Potential confounding events include dividend declarations,
impending mergers, government contract signage, new product announcements,
lawsuits, and executive changes. If any of these events occur during the event
window of a specific study, researchers cannot be certain that the impact on the
share price is due to the phenomenon of interest. It is for this reason that the
examined event window remains small so that researchers can have confidence
they have controlled for confounding events. However, most scholars to date are
not sensitive about this vital assumption.
The last assumption of this methodology is that the event was
unanticipated by the investors (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). If this assumption
is satisfied, the abnormal returns, as it were, can naturally be assumed to have
resulted from investor-based reactions to new information. Although it is possible
that information about an event is leaked to investors in advance of the formal
announcement, researchers have rarely addressed it outside of corporate control
issues. Such leakages can cause problems for the event study methodology if it
is difficult to determine when investors were initially exposed to new information.
STATISTICAL AND INFERENTIAL ISSUES
Multivariate regression models, such as those used to estimate a firm's
predicted returns in the event study, are subject to a number of statistical
assumptions. Specifically, these models assume that the residuals are normally
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distributed with a mean of zero, have a constant variance, are not correlated with
the explanatory variables, and are not serially correlated. Serial correlation refers
to error terms that come from distinctive time periods (i.e., cross-section
observations) and are correlated. This occurs in time-series studies when the
errors are associated within a specified time period transfer over into impending
time periods. Further, in cases where different regressions can be run for
different units of observation, no correlation exists between residuals for those
units. Simulated and empirical studies show that neglecting features of the data
such as non-normality, autocorrelation, changes in event period variance, and
heteroskedasticity can lead to test statistics that do not follow their assumed
distribution (Deitz, Evans, and Hansen, 2012). For instance, Kramer's (2001)
Monte Carlo results indicate that the statistical size of commonly employed test
statistics showed significant bias when the data exhibited characteristics identical
to those observed in actual stock returns. Moreover, using simulated data, Hein
and Westfall (2004) found that traditionally calculated p-values are actually
biased downward dramatically when the number of firms is large and residual
distribution is heavy-tailed, causing the researcher to conclude that an event is
significant too frequently.
SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION
A description of the data is now provided, followed by the cross-sectional
regression variable measurements. Control variables are then introduced, and
the section concludes by describing the data collection procedure for this study.
Following standard practice (Cornwell, Pruitt and Clark 2005), the University of
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Chicago’s computerized Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database served as the data source for all analyzed stock market data.
Therefore, only publicly traded U.S. companies were available for analysis. Most
studies to date, limit the amount of data gathered for relevance with respect to
current marketing practice. However, this study spans a significant amount of
time (i.e., CRM campaigns from 2005-2013) in order to gather enough data. By
the end, we had gathered announcements for over 70 publically traded, U.S.
firms, ultimately giving us 140 announcement dates.
MEASURES
The independent variables considered in the model include three firm
factors, one nonprofit factor, and two alliance factors. The firm factors include
corporate reputation, cash flow, and market share. The nonprofit factor
investigated is nonprofit governmental resource dependence (NGRD). Finally,
alliance factors include in-kind donations and campaign duration. Table 4
provides a list of the dependent, independent and control variables for this study
along with their notation, how they were measured, the data source, and prior
literature that supports the variable’s use.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Shareholder Value. Shareholder value was calculated as the cumulative
abnormal stock market return over a period of five days (i.e., -2 to +2 window) in
order to account for the CRM announcement’s full impact on the market.
Because all the firms in this study are publically traded, there is a significant
opportunity for information to be leaked, intentionally or unintentionally, prior to

60

Table 4
List of Dependent, Independent and Control Variables
Variables

Notation

Measured
Variable

Data Source

Prior Literature
Support

Shareholder
Value

Cumulative
Abnormal Stock
Market Returns

CSRP

Srivastava, Shervani,
and Fahey (1998); Day
and Fahey (1988)

Corporate
Reputation

Reputation

Reputation
quotient provided
by Fortune

Fortune Most
Reputable List

Fombrun, Gardberg,
and Sever (2000)

Cash Flow

Cash Flow

Ratio of corporate
cash flow to
market value of
corporate equity

COMPUSTAT

Gupta and Lehmann
(2003); Rust, et al.,
(2004)

Market Share

Market
Share

Ratio of individual
sales to the
industry sales

COMPUSTAT

Ghosh (2004)

Nonprofit
Governmental
Resource
Dependence

NGRD

Ratio of
government
grants accepted
relative to NP’s
total revenue

IRS Form 990

Novel Variable

In-Kind
Donations

In-Kind

Firm donates any
in-kind resource

Press
Releases

Folse et al. (2014)

Campaign
Duration

Duration

Firm makes multiyear commitment
to the cause

Press
Releases

Miller (2002). Till and
Nowak (2000); Van den
Brink et al., (2006)

ROA

Ratio of net
income to total
assets

COMPUSTAT

Ferreira and Laux
(2007); Kamstra, et al.
(2001)

Leverage

Ratio of long-term
debt to total
assets

COMPUSTAT

Coles, Daniel, and
Naveen (2006)

Size

Number of
employees

COMPUSTAT

Ahuja and Lampert
(2001); Miles, Covin,
and Heeley (2000)

Dependent
Shareholder
Value
Independent

Control
Return on
Assets
Firm Leverage

Firm Size
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the announcement of a CRM campaign. Leakages can be a result of many things
including legitimate negotiations ahead of the final contract agreement or from
employees that are intimately familiar with the internal culture and operations of
the organization involved in the process who could possibly have a more
perverse motive for leaking the information. Moreover, like sponsorships, CRM
campaigns are usually the result of a strategic planning process, and therefore,
the information of the impending alliance has the potential to be leaked or
anticipated by some investors (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Therefore, this
study uses data taken at t = -2 and -1 in order to control for the potential leakage
of news prior to the announcement.
It is also important to note that there may be some lag between the official
announcement and when the full information of the campaign was made
available. Following standard procedure, we suggest that the initial press
announcement does not provide sufficient information for investors to make
informed decisions (Wiles and Danielova, 2009). Days +1 and +2 were,
therefore, justified by the fact that it may take time to establish the characteristics
of certain events (Barnett and King, 2008).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Corporate Reputation. Corporate reputation was measured by a reputation
quotient (i.e., a definitive report card) provided by Fortune
(http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/mostadmired/2014/index.html). A
company’s score must rank in the top half of its industry survey to be listed. The
scores ranged from 0 to 10 and take into account surveys distributed to
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approximately 4,100 stakeholders of the firm, including executives, directors, and
securities analysts. Those surveys are aggregated to form a composite score for
each company on the list. In order to create the list, various stakeholders were
asked to rate companies on nine unique criteria, ranging from investment value
to corporate social responsibility.
Cash Flow. The firm’s cash flow was measured by the level of corporate
cash flow divided by the market value of corporate equity (Srivastava et al.,
1999). This variable was calculated from data available from COMPUSTAT.
When there was missing data in the database, company-specific sources such
as corporate annual reports were incorporated.
Market Share. The firm’s market share was measured by the company’s
individual sales relative to the industry sales (Cornwell et al., 2005). This variable
was also calculated from data available from COMPUSTAT. When there was
missing data in the database, annual reports were utilized once again.
Government Resource Dependence. The extent that a nonprofit’s revenue
was allocated by government entities was measured by the dollar amount of
government grants the nonprofit received relative to the total revenue
accumulated by the nonprofit. This information was provided on nonprofit tax
returns (IRS Form 990) filed with the Internal Revenue Service. Most of the 990
forms were available through nonprofit accountability websites such as Charity
Navigator and GuideStar data sources. The remaining 990 forms were found by
going to individual nonprofit websites.
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In-Kind Donations. In-kind donations were recorded as a binary variable. If
it was mentioned in the press release that the company donated any type of inkind resource (i.e., employee expertise, product, etc.) to the cause during the
campaign, that firm’s code = 1. If there was no mention of that firm donating inkind resources to the cause during the campaign, that firm’s code = 0.
Campaign Duration. The duration of the campaign was also recorded as a
binary variable. If it was mentioned in the press release that the company was
dedicating more than one year to the cause or had been involved with the cause
for at least one year prior, that firm’s code = 1. If the press release revealed that
the campaign was both in its inaugural year and would only be initiated for that
one year, then that firm’s code = 0. The reason this variable was not measured
as continuous is that several campaigns reported that the campaign was a “multiyear” campaign, leaving the exact campaign duration unclear.
CONTROL VARIABLES
Following advice from the finance literature, this study included accounting
control variables previously used by various scholars (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001;
Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Miles, Covin, and Heeley, 2000), who found that these
measures were associated with shareholder value of the firm. Therefore, this
study included those measures suggested by those studies in order to ensure
that any relationship found is not a result of other confounding variables.
Return on assets (ROA). ROA was computed as the ratio of a firm’s net
income to total assets. Greater ROA should be associated with positive abnormal
returns because it indicates the firm’s likely future financial health (Ferreira and
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Laux, 2007). This is important considering investors evaluate firm investments –
which in this case are CRM campaigns – through the lens of the potential future
cash flow the investment could return.
Firm Leverage. The finance literature has also identified firm leverage as
being associated with performance indicators such as net working capital,
dividend payouts, bond ratings, favorable capital expenditures and acquisitions
(Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2007). Firm leverage was computed as the ratio of
long-term debt to total assets.
Firm size. This study controls for firm size because it has previously been
shown to affect performance (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Miles, Covin, and
Heeley, 2000). Firm size is also a relevant variable because large firms may
have more resources, thus experiencing economies of scale. This variable was
operationalized as the number of employees that work for the firm. Previous
research has suggested that annual revenue, sales, and number of employees
are all equally appropriate indicators of a firm’s size (Harrison et al., 1988).
Economic Year and Industry. To test whether our results were caused by
the economic environment (i.e., year of the announcement) or by the industry, we
included dummy variables identifying the announcements associated with the
year (year-dummy) and the industry (industry-dummy). For example, if a
company made a CRM announcement in 2009, when donations and the stock
market were both down as compared to 2007 when donations and the stock
market were both on the rise, that should be taken into consideration when
measuring abnormal stock returns. Intuitively, there should be a larger effect size
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during years when the economy is up and investors are paying attention to the
stock market. Moreover, the type of industry in which the business operates is
important to control for because certain industries are more involved with CSR
behavior than others because of the nature of their business. For example,
manufacturers typically exhibit the most hazardous waste (Environmental
Protection Agency, 2015). Tables 5 and 6 exhibit the descriptive statistics and
correlation matrix for the variables in the proposed model.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
_________________________________________________________________________________________________

N
Minimum
Maximum
M
SD
_____________________________________________________________________________
Alliance Factors
In-Kind
Duration

140
140

0
0

1
1

.44
.55

.499
.499

Firm Factors
Reputation
Cash Flow
Market Share

135
138
140

4.97
-49,579
.003

8.44
95,932
.998

6.84
10,479
.279

.798
17,213
.222

Nonprofit Factors
GDR

138

.000

.957

.159

.261

Control Factors
ROA
Leverage
Size

140
140
139

- .112
.000
1

.237
.568
1700

.071
.200
136.4

.063
.140
165.18

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6
Correlation Matrix for Variables in Proposed Model
________________________________________________________________________________________________

CAR

In-Kind

Duration

Reputation CF

Market

GDR

Leverage

Size

ROA

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

CAR

1.00

In-Kind

.326**

1.00

Duration

-.221**

-.147

1.00

Reputation .030

.025

.114

1.00

Cash Flow .197

.134

-.020

.197*

1.00

Market

.102

.036

.078

.145

.035

1.00

NGRD

-.290**

-.106

.149

.093

.170

.242**

Leverage

-.037

-.004

-.126

-.276**

-.216*

-.091

-.165

1.00

Firm Size

.005

.036

.114

.013

.457**

.113

-.034

.113

-.055

-.049

.122

.280*

-.174*

.239**

.224**

-.261**

ROA

1.00

1.00
-.139

1.00

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________

DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE
Our sample frame consisted of firms that appeared on the Fortune Most
Admired list between 2005 and 2013. Approximately 350 firms appear on the
most reputable list each year. Generally the same firms comprise this list with the
exception of a few that drop out or are added. For example, Apple Computer
showed up every year during our time frame. However, Amerigroup Life
Insurance does not appear in the list until 2010. After a thorough search through
Fortune’s most reputable list for each year in our study, 148 CRM
announcements were identified and authenticated. While searching for firms that
engaged in CRM between 2005 and 2013, we were forced to utilize a filter that
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only included firms that were listed as most reputable, publicly traded, and
operated in the United States. In other words, many of the firms appearing on
Fortune’s most reputable list, were not publically traded, nor operated inside the
United States. Because of the statistical procedure that was employed in the
production of the stock market results for this study (i.e., Scholes-Williams
standardized cross-sectional market model), our CRM announcement dates were
somewhat limited.
Furthermore, an assortment of combinations of phrases was utilized to
search for and ultimately identify as many firms as possible that engaged in CRM
within our timeframe. These assortments included the company name plus the
phrase “announced today” or “today announced” plus various forms of the word
donate (e.g., donated, donation, donating) plus variation of CRM (e.g., cause
campaign, cause-related marketing campaign, and cause marketing campaign).
At this point 148 CRM campaigns and their dates were identified using the LexisNexis database, corporate and nonprofit websites and other online sources. After
adjusting for eight confounding events, the sample depleted to 140 usable dates.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS
The event day was the date that the firm formally announced that it would
be partnering with a nonprofit organization and that a CRM campaign would
commence at a future date. Although most CRM campaigns were announced
through corporate and nonprofit press releases, news outlets, and csrwire.com,
some were identified using the Lexis-Nexis database, corporate and nonprofit
websites and other online sources. Moreover, following McWilliams and Siegel’s
(1997) recommendations, we used several sources to identify potentially
confounding events. The reason we controlled for confounding events is so that
we could be certain that the impact on share price is due to the announcement of
a CRM campaign and nothing else. We were able to detect eight confounding
events, bringing our total sample size to 140 dates. Table 7 below provides
details relating to all confounding events identified in our sample. All identified
confounding events occurred within the event window for the study, which was (2 to +2). We then accumulated daily stock returns from the CRSP database.
Again, following recommendations from Cowan (2003), we estimated parameters
of the market model for each firm over a 255 trading day estimation window,
ending 61 days before the event. Lastly, the event study and cross-sectional
analysis both used statistical tests that were two-tailed.
This study investigated several event windows within the five days
surrounding the event in order to account for the CRM announcement’s full
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Table 7
Confounding Events
Company

CRM Date

Confounding Event a

AT&T

03/14/2007

AT&T Invests $750
million to Speed
Advanced Solutions
to Business Customers

03/13/2007

General Electric

05/14/2012

GE issues a quarterly
dividend of $475 million

05/16/2012

Hewlett Packard

09/22/2008

HP Board Authorizes
Additional $8 Billion for
Share Repurchases

09/22/2008

Honeywell
International

10/04/2005

Honeywell to Acquire
Remaining Stake in
UOP LLC Joint Venture

10/03/2005

IBM

04/23/2007

To Aid Share Price,
I.B.M. Raises Dividend
and Increases Buyback

04/25/2007

Morgan Stanley

10/19/2009

Announced Quarterly
Results

10/21/2009

Procter and
Gamble

10/02/2008

P&G Implements Cisco
TelePresence Solution
in Latin
America saving millions
of dollars per month

09/30/2008

Yum! Brands

04/14/2010

Announced Quarterly
Results

04/14/2010

a

Date

All identified confounding events occurred within the event window for
the study, which was (-2 to +2).
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impact on the market. This approach is consistent with earlier marketing event
studies (Brown and Warner, 1985; Flammer, 2013; Friedman and Singh, 1989).
Days -2 and -1 were included to incorporate potentially leaked information. Like
sponsorships, CRM campaigns are usually the result of a strategic planning
process, and therefore, the information of the impending alliance has the
potential to be leaked or anticipated by some investors (McWilliams and Siegel,
1997). Thus, this approach also allows us to account for potential information
leakage occurring prior to the official announcement. Furthermore, because the
marketing literature traditionally uses the press announcement as the event
“moment”, there may be some lag between that moment and when the full
information of the campaign is made available. We believe that the initial press
announcement does not provide sufficient information for investors to make
informed decisions (Wiles and Danielova, 2009). For example, some initial press
releases leave out the duration of the campaign, suggesting there is a lag
between the event “moment” and when full information about the CRM campaign
is available. Days +1 and +2 were incorporated because it may very well take
time to establish the characteristics of certain events, with the market receiving
information in the few days following the events (Barnett and King, 2008).
EVENT RESULTS
Table 8 below presents the average abnormal returns for the 140
announcements on the event day, as well as 21 individual days around the
event. Results show that, on average, announcements of CRM campaigns are
significantly associated with negative returns on the day of the event. The
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TABLE 8
Excess Returns of 140 Announcements of CRM Campaigns
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Event
Day

N

Average
Abnormal
Return

% ARs
Negative

Portfolio
Time
Series

Jackknife
Z

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140

0.10%
-0.27%
0.38%
-0.03%
0.15%
-0.06%
0.15%
0.40%
-0.19%
-0.23%
-0.25%
-0.08%
-0.11%
-0.04%
-0.06%
-0.12%
-0.20%
0.04%
-0.10%
0.08%
0.23%

51.4
59.2
46.5
54.2
52.1
55.6
52.8
49.3
50.0
56.3
57.0
54.9
48.6
52.8
53.5
52.8
50.0
57.0
55.6
49.3
54.2

0.848
-2.191*
3.067**
-0.270
1.192
-0.478
1.206
3.225***
-1.511
-1.880*
-2.021*
-0.619
-0.914
-0.324
-0.467
-0.945
-1.644
0.295
-0.819
0.690
1.849*

0.424
-1.729*
2.208
-0.846
0.772
-1.207
0.992
2.153*
-0.083
-2.528**
-1.410
-0.654
-0.846
-0.135
-0.549
-0.519
-1.528
-0.133
-1.260
0.570
0.930

________________________________________________________________
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

average abnormal return for the event day is -0.25%, which is statistically
significant (t = -2.021, p < .05). This presents the second largest decrease in
excess returns over a period of ±10 days around the event day. The only event
day that exceeded this percentage was day -9, whose average abnormal return
was -0.27%. Moreover, every day in the five-day window surrounding the event is
negative, which adds rigor to our theory that CRM campaigns have a negative
impact on shareholder wealth. Most importantly, however, is the fact that days -1
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and 0 are the only days that have a significant negative average abnormal return
during the event window, which is consistent with the efficient market assumption
implicit in event study methodology (Fama, 1970). Interestingly, day -3 exhibits a
significant positive abnormal return. One can easily infer that information was
slightly leaked on day -2 (t = -1.511, p < .10), and then progressively more on
day -1 (t = -1.880, p < .05), until finally the announcement was officially made on
day 0. The subsequent days after the event are also negative, although not
significant.
Furthermore, it is standard practice in an event study to examine the
cumulative excess returns for various windows that surround the event day
window for two reasons. First, analyzing abnormal returns surrounding the event
day allows for any uncertainty concerning the initial announcement date of the
event. Second, it allows researchers to capture the cumulative impact of the
event. In other words, the effect may be spread over several days surrounding
the event day because of the gradual accessibility of information and
interpretation of the event’s impact on future firm profitability.
Table 9 below reveals that all of the event windows around the time of the
event were significantly negative, which provides rigor to our theory that in
general, the market responds negatively to CRM campaign announcements.
During the -2 to +2 window, we found that the announcement of a CRM
campaign by the firm produced a significant abnormal return of -0.89 percent (t =
-3.229, p < .001), which strongly supports our primary hypothesis that the
announcement of CRM campaigns would have a negative impact on shareholder
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Table 9
Standardized Abnormal Returns for CRM Announcements

Event
Window

N

Mean
Abnormal
Return

Positive:
Negative

Portfolio
Time-Series
(CDA) t

(–2, +2)

140

- 0.89 %

56:84**

- 3.23***

- 2.06*

-2.63**

(-2, +1)

140

- 0.77 %

53:87***

- 3.12***

- 2.16*

-2.25*

(–2, 0)

140

- 0.66 %

60:80

- 3.11***

- 2.00*

-2.08*

(–1, +2)

140

- 0.66 %

57:83**

- 2.70**

- 2.29*

-2.92**

(-1, +1)

140

- 0.55 %

56:84**

- 2.58**

- 2.49**

-2.65**

(-1, 0)

140

- 0.46 %

57:83**

- 2.656**

- 2.44**

-2.72**

Rank Test
Z

Jackknife
Z

* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

wealth. Our justification for using the given event window was based upon
significant test results that revealed the relative magnitude of the CRM
announcement on stock price during this specific event window. Thus, on
average, the announcement of CRM campaigns is decreasing a firm’s stock price
by .89% over the five-day interval. To put this into perspective, Apple Computers,
a firm valued at $733 billion, would lose approximately $6.52 billion in
shareholder value concurrent with their CRM announcement.
Additional support for CRM’s shareholder wealth effects is provided by the
significant associated binomial proportionality test statistic (Z). Of the 140
abnormal returns in our sample, 84 of them were negative (Z = -2.055, p < .05),
which provides additional support for the robustness of the negative effect
associated with the announcement of CRM campaigns. Moreover, the Jackknife
Z test is significant (Z= -2.634, p > .01), suggesting that our significant results
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were not due to outliers (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Lastly, evidence of
significant negative returns on the event day and the cumulative average return
over five days (including the event day) suggest that, on average, the market
quickly reacts negatively to announcements of CRM campaigns.
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS
After determining the significance of the abnormal returns, a second stage
of analysis was utilized in order to explain the cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs). We did this by demonstrating that the cross-sectional variation in the
abnormal returns across firms was consistent with both well-documented
theories (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), along with other novel theories not yet
considered within this context.
Now investors undoubtedly take into account several factors when
assessing actions of the firm, which include social investments such as CRM
campaigns. These factors must be considered from both their immediate
financial impact as well as their long-term impact on goodwill, attitudes and brand
loyalty. We investigate factors of the sponsoring firm, the nonprofit organization,
and the alliance that we anticipate help explain the cross-sectional variation of
the abnormal returns registered by firms around the time of the CRM
announcement. Explicitly, in the second stage of the analysis, we regressed the
CAR associates with the CRM event on several hypothesized variables and
reported the parameter estimates. We demonstrate that the pattern of abnormal
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TABLE 10
Cross-Sectional Regression Results
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Model 1: Controls
________________

Model 2: IVs + Controls
____________________

Model 3: Interactions + IVs + Controls
________________________________

Parameter
Parameter
Parameter
Independent Variables
Estimate
t-test
Estimate
t-test
Estimate
t-test
_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Hypotheses
H2: Reputation (+)
H3: Cash Flow (+)
H4: Market Share (+)
H5: NGRD (-)
H6: InKind (+)
H7: Duration (-)
H8: RepXInKind (-)
H9: RepXNGRD (+)
Controls
ROA
Leverage
Size
Observations
2
R
2
Adjusted R
F-value
F-probability

.07
.25
.27
-.39
.24
-.09

-.02
-.02
.00

-.14
-.23
.04
123
.05
-.07
.42
p = .96

.71
1.93*
2.71***
-4.05***
2.83***
-.99

.01
-.01
-.21

.04
-.08
-1.58
123
.32
.19
2.56
p < .01

.25
.17
.27
-.41
.30
-.11
-.32
.22

2.02**
1.40
2.94***
-4.60***
3.63***
-1.27
-2.84***
2.53**

-.06
-.04
-.16

-.56
-.38
-1.24
123
.42
.30
3.49
p < .01

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

*p < .10.
**p ≤ .05.
***p ≤ .01.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________

returns is consistent with established theories, which gives the findings in this
study empirical credibility (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Model results appear in
Table 10 below.
The model improved significantly with the addition of the theoretical
variables (model 2 vs. model 1) and interaction variables (model 3 vs. model 2).
The hypothesized model included control variables, independent variables, and
interaction variables, was significant (F21, 123 = 3.492, p < .01) with an Adjusted R-

76

square of .298. We, therefore, find strong support for the idea that the economic
worth of CRM campaigns is contingent upon several hypothesized factors.
Concerning our firm-specific factors, we found two of our hypothesized
variables were capable of significantly impacting the abnormal stock returns.
Corporate reputation had a positive main effect on abnormal returns (bREPUTATION
= .245, p < .05), which supports H2. We did not, however, find support that
companies possessing a healthy amount of cash flow positively affect the
economic worth of CRM campaigns (bCASHFLOW = .172, p = .164). Like reputation,
market share was shown to positively impact the abnormal stock returns of the
firm (bMARKETSHARE = .274, p < .01), which is in support of H4.
Concerning our nonprofit factor, the results indicate that nonprofit
governmental resource dependence explains more variance in investor reactions
than any other variable in this study. We find that a nonprofit’s revenue
dependence on one entity has a severe dampening effect on CRM worth (bNGRD
= -.414, p < .01), which is in strong support of H5. This result suggests that firms
should stay far away from causes that receive the majority of their support from
one entity.
Concerning the alliance factors, abnormal return from the CRM campaign
announcement is enhanced when the firm is committed to some form of in-kind
contribution to the cause (bINKIND = .297, p < .01), which is in support of H6. We
did not find that the duration of the CRM campaign had a significant impact on
the worth of the CRM campaign (bDURATION = -.105, p = .206). However, even
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though this hypothesis was not significant, the results still indicate that investors
hold somewhat of a negative perception toward one-year campaigns.
Lastly, both interaction hypotheses received strong support. First, the
economic worth of CRM campaigns is contingent upon the interaction of a firm’s
reputation and its propensity to give in-kind resources to the cause. Specifically,
the firm’s reputation moderated the relationship between in-kind donations and
abnormal stock returns, such that the abnormal returns were larger for firms with
weaker reputations and smaller for firms with stronger reputations (bREPXINKIND = .317, p < .01). This was in support of H8. Second, the economic worth of CRM
campaigns is also contingent upon the interaction of firm reputation and firm
alliance with nonprofits that are perceived as legitimate. Specifically, firm
reputation moderated the relationship between nonprofit governmental resource
dependence and abnormal stock returns, such that the abnormal returns were
larger for firms with stronger reputations and smaller for firms with weaker
reputations (bREPXNGDR = .222, p = .013). This result shows strong support for H9.
ROBUSTNESS OF PROPOSED THEORY
To ensure that our theory of investor-based reactions to CRM
announcements was both legitimate and rigorous, we analyzed additional event
windows around the actual event date (refer to Table 6). There were a few
inconsistencies found in three of the windows, namely -2 to 0, -1 to +1, and -1 to
0. During the -2 to 0 window, market share (bMARKETSHARE = .155, p = .101) and
reputation (bREPUTATION = .225, p = .068) were found to not have significant impact
on shareholder value, although campaign duration was found to be significant in
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the hypothesized direction (bDURATION = -1.988, p < .05). The effect of market
share on abnormal returns was also non-significant during the -1 to +1 window
(bMARKETSHARE = .175, p = .084) and again during the -1 to 0 window (bMARKETSHARE
= .121, p = .227).
None of these results should alter the conclusions presented in this study.
For the most part, all relationships hold true no matter what window is observed.
Market share appears to be the only variable that is inconsistent. However, upon
closer examination, this inconsistency could be explained by the fact that
investors may need more time to take into account the firm’s presence in the
market. In other words, shareholders may need more time to understand and
evaluate the impact of market share on CRM investments of the firm. Overall,
these results provide evidence that our proposed theory is in fact rigorous when
you consider that our best results occur during the five-day event window (i.e., -2
to +2), which accounts for leaks of information and gradually allows for
subsequent information about the event to be disseminated to investors for
processing and evaluation.
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION
In the modern business era, marketing managers and senior executives
are increasingly held accountable for the returns on marketing investments. One
such group that should hold these individuals accountable is the investors of the
firm (Olson and Thjømøe, 2009). Therefore, a natural question that must be
acknowledged is, “Does the investment community care about the marketing
activities utilized by firms?” Practitioners and scholars alike have sought to
understand and explicate the manner for which marketing investments should be
distributed, in hopes of revealing how they should be implemented to support
various strategies that help differentiate and raise awareness for the firm. This
study directly addresses this issue by testing a framework, which predicts the
impact of the announcement of CRM campaigns on shareholder wealth. Using
140 announcements of CRM campaigns for over 70 different publically traded,
U.S. companies, this study reveals that investors are indeed sensitive to the
announcement of CRM campaigns by demonstrating a negative effect on
shareholder wealth. This study also finds that investors feel CRM campaigns
should be operated within a set of boundaries. Although our analyses indicated
that the market reacts both positively and negatively to the announcement of
CRM campaigns, which is reflected in both positive and negative abnormal
returns during the event window (i.e., -2 to +2), on average, investors do not
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appear to value the current practice of CRM. By developing this theoretical
framework and empirically testing its predictions, we obtain several theoretical
and managerial insights.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
This study extends the marketing-finance research interface, something
that has been called for by exemplary scholars of the marketing discipline (Luo
and Bhattacharya, 2009; Reibstein, Day, and Wind, 2009). We have carefully
attempted to demonstrate the relationship between announcements of CRM
campaigns and shareholder wealth, while controlling for various finance and
accounting variables. The results of this study unequivocally build on preceding
research providing additional guidance for the interlude between marketing and
finance research. Furthermore, this research addresses a significant gap in the
marketing-finance literature by examining one of the pivotal determinants of
investor decision-making, namely shareholder value within a CRM context.
Another important contribution of this study is that it developed a greater
understanding of the influence of sponsorship-related expenditures –which in this
case is CRM – on shareholder value. To our knowledge, this is the first study to
examine the influence of the specific strategic market investment of CRM and its
impact on shareholder value. This type of study provides clarity to the oftenmuddled relationship between corporate social responsibility of the firm and how
that practice can impact a firm’s financials. It adds to the expanding literature on
the influence of marketing actions on firm financial metrics.

81

Another important contribution made by this study was that it opened up
another portal of investigation into the brand-cause fit relationship, which has
previously kept scholars from consensus. The findings in this study suggest that
investors react positively to firms when they utilize in-kind resources as a means
for which to donate to causes. In-kind donations seem to imply a certain degree
of fit, commitment, strategy and altruism between the sponsor and the nonprofit
organization, elements that have been given much attention in the literature,
often times with conflicting results. Therefore, much more research should be
conducted into the consumer and investor evaluations of in-kind resources, and
how those resources are linked to or even more representative of some of the
aforementioned variables.
We also used nonprofit governmental resource dependence as a way to
determine the perceived trustworthiness of the nonprofit as well as its ability to
fundraise effectively through multiple sources. Because this variable explained
more variance in abnormal stock returns than any other variable in our model,
much more research must be conducted to see if the negative effect to abnormal
returns is due to the general fund allocation from one entity, or if it is specifically
the relationship with government entities that is causing investors to react so
poorly. This finding should raise significant concerns on the part of executives
making social investment decisions. The spillover effect found in the results
suggest partnering with trustworthy causes that are capable of raising funds from
the general public is perhaps more important than the execution itself.
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Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature by observing that the
abnormal returns on stock prices were determined by an interaction of the firm’s
reputation with both in-kind donations and nonprofit governmental resource
dependence. The first interaction was the reputation of the firm moderating the
positive relationship between in-kind donations and abnormal returns, such that
the positive effect was weaker for sponsoring firms with a stronger reputation. In
other words, because of the skepticism surrounding the practice of CRM, firms
with weaker reputations must be flawless in their CRM execution. Therefore,
when these firms give in a way that investors approve, they should see a greater
positive effect than firms known for their strong reputation (Nowak and
Washburn, 2000). The second interaction was the reputation of the firm
moderating the negative relationship between the nonprofit governmental
resource dependence and abnormal stock returns, such that the negative effect
is mitigated for sponsor firms with stronger reputations. Therefore it would appear
that firms with stronger reputations have more leeway for behavior investors
deem inappropriate.
In summation, this study contributes to the growing marketing-finance
interface literature. It adds to the finance literature by showing that there are
additional drivers of shareholder value beyond those traditionally studied in the
field of finance. As such, this study (1) helps bridge the knowledge gap in the
marketing-finance literature and (2) better prepares those individuals who make
financial decisions for the firm with additional research that can help alleviate the
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pressure of making those decisions. The subsequent paragraphs discuss the
managerial implications of this study.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
According to Luo and Battacharya (2009), “Marketing strategy can
successfully and meaningfully meet Wall Street”. Although CRM was designed to
be a strategic social investment, the manner in which corporate America is
engaging in this marketing communication tool has become very worrisome. This
research demonstrates that investors do in fact evaluate and incorporate
information related to marketing strategies and marketing expenditures (or at
least anticipated expenditures), which includes cause-related marketing
investments.
Interestingly, previous sponsorship research has consistently shown that
there exists a generally positive response from investors as it relates to
sponsorship announcements when using measures of abnormal returns for short
event windows (Cornwell, Pruitt, and Clark, 2005; Deitz, Evans, and Hensen,
2010). This study addresses what has previously been unexamined, which is
how social sponsorships negatively influence shareholder wealth during short
event windows. In other words, the announcement of CRM campaigns by the
firm plays an attenuating role on shareholder value. However, firm leadership
should not be wholly disappointed by these results, as the cross-sectional
analysis in this study revealed several encouraging outcomes that firms should
utilized when engaging in CRM. As Reibstein, Day, and Wind (2009) pointed out,
marketing managers must address the area of firm resource distribution, or what

84

should drive and determine the amount of investment and pinpoint areas where
the firm’s limited resources should be utilized. As competition increases,
resources will become increasingly precious, and marketing managers, therefore,
will be all the more faced with requests for accountability of the resources that
they disseminate throughout the firm. The results of this study reveal that CRM
campaigns have the potential to provide a viable avenue for reaching target
markets and have an impact on important financial metrics of the firm. However,
this can only be accomplished if managers play close attention to certain
boundary conditions suggested by this study.
Results form this study reveal that a significant percentage of negative
abnormal returns to the sponsoring firms was observed during the event window;
on average, the sponsoring firms recorded a loss of .89% (t = -3.229, p < .001,
two-tailed) in their market value as a result of announcing a CRM campaign for
the near future, which strongly supports H1. We looked at several “windows”
around the event day and found that, on average, all of the windows exhibited a
significant negative abnormal return for the firms. Overall, these results clearly
indicate a negative impact of the announcement of CRM campaigns on expected
future profits on the firm, which should call managers and executives to, at the
very least, recalibrate their current CRM philosophies.
Another interesting finding from this study is that there are several factors
that help explain the cross-sectional regression of the abnormal returns, which
should provide practitioners and empiricists boundary conditions for which to
utilize CRM as a marketing communication tool. Investors appear to reward firms
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for their CRM efforts when they conduct themselves in certain ways and also
exhibit certain characteristics as a firm during the campaign. First, a firm
choosing to donate some form of in-kind resources to the cause is something
that investors seem to approve of. This resource utilization appears to be
signaling positive elements of fit, commitment, long-term strategy and altruism
between the firm and the cause. Investors also appear to reward firms that
possess strong corporate reputations and exhibit a strong market presence.
Because skepticism is infused in the perception of CRM, the market apparently
only approves of firms that are acting out of their reputation instead of trying to
improve it. Moreover, firms exhibiting greater market share receive the benefit of
the doubt from investors on social investments relative to those firms that exhibit
weaker market shares. The logic here is that these firms have been successful in
the past with their investments, which has helped garner market share, and
therefore social investments may be no different (Bergh and Gibbons, 2011).
Alternatively, investors seem to punish firms to the extent that they partner with
causes that receive significant amounts of government funding. The reason that
this was expected is that attitudes toward one object have been shown to “spill
over” onto other associated objects (Simonin and Ruth, 1998). Therefore, firms
partnering with nonprofits that exhibit weak fundraising capabilities from multiple
sources should receive negative spillover effects from the nonprofit organization
to the firm, which should manifest in negative firm value (i.e., stock price).
Managers should proceed with caution when aligning with causes that are
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heavily funded by government entities. These results should provide managers
with valid boundary conditions for which to engage in CRM moving forward.
Lastly, although there have been a plethora of studies advocating for the
positive effects of CRM, the results from this research suggest that this view is
generally not shared by investors. The negative abnormal returns found here
reflect the market’s general belief that the expected incremental gain from CRM
efforts does not exceed its incremental costs. Still, it can be inferred from the
widespread and consistent use of CRM, that executives continue to believe that
this communication tool is a worthwhile piece of the marketing strategy of the
firm, despite the costs involved. The bad news, according to the PKM (Friestad
and Wright, 1994), is that skepticism of social investments is only going to
increase over time. Managers and executives would do well to understand the
market’s desire for firms to engage in strategic as opposed to tactical CRM as
they conceptualize their marketing strategies moving forward.
In summation, our results certainly offer insight to firms considering the
use of CRM as a marketing communication tool. Although this research provides
evidence that CRM generally exhibits an attenuating effect on shareholder
wealth, it also indicates that there are tangible ways that the firm can avoid such
effects by alleviating the market’s skepticism of the practice. These results
confirm the importance of utilizing strategic CRM, which was first presented by
Varadarajan and Menon’s (1988) in their seminal article on how CRM should be
conducted by the firm.
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Our conclusion about the ability of CRM announcements to diminish a
firm’s market value is subject to a few limitations, which should be addressed in
further research. First, the nature of the event study methodology limits the
sample to firm’s that are publically traded and in the United States. Therefore,
future research needs to provide better representativeness, incorporating other
countries and smaller businesses. The event study methodology also does not
allow for consideration of smaller businesses that are unlisted in the CRSP
market index. Although these limitations affect generalizability of our approach, it
most definitely does not affect its validity (Madden et al., 2006). Another potential
concern is that the event study methodology is only capable of detecting the
effects of changes in stock price if, and only if, markets are entirely efficient.
Therefore, because capital markets are not always efficient (Fornell et al., 2006;
Joshi and Hanssens, 2010), long-term models should study the impact of CRM
expenditures on firm value.
Second, we restricted our examination of CRM announcements to firms
that were considered to be the most reputable according to Fortune’s reputation
quotient. Our significant result for CRM announcements our sample was limited
to only firms that show up on Fortune’s most reputable list. Although reputation
was expected to play an extremely important role in how investors react to CRM
announcements, it explained less variance in the abnormal returns on stock price
and was barely significant (p = .045). Although the range of reputation scores for
our sample was 4.97 to 8.44, the mean was 6.84. Fortune has computed
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reputation quotients for many publically traded companies that do not show up on
their most reputable list (i.e., the scores fall well below five). Therefore, care
should be taken when generalizing these cross-sectional results because our
sample is restricted to only those firms deemed most reputable by Fortune.
However, given that the range was restricted for the reputation quotient,
incorporating the full range should, in theory, represent a stronger test of the
relationship between corporate reputation and shareholder value. On the other
hand, the inclusion of other firms with lower reputation quotients may impact the
event study and regression results in unknown ways.
Third, this study may have been limited by how we operationalized certain
variables. One possible reason for the insignificant result for duration could be
the fact that we were limited on how we could measure this variable. Although
the majority of campaign announcements included the exact duration of the
campaign, too many suggested that it was simply a “multi-year” campaign, and
we, therefore, dichotomized the variable. This obviously limits the potential
variance explained by duration and perhaps significance. Future research should
try to incorporate duration as a continuous variable. It should also be noted, that
this study only accounted for firm cash flow reported before the campaign
announcement. Because the tendency of a firm’s cash flow situation is to
fluctuate, perhaps the significance of this variable should be investigated on a
multi-year basis instead of a single year.
Additional concerns relate to self-selection of variable data and the
potential for endogeneity caused by an unknown confounding variable. Future
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search may also investigate the impact of other variables, such as brand equity,
and/or incorporate alternative measures of modeled variables (e.g. reputation,
cash flow and duration). Future inquirers of this topic should also explore the
effects of CRM announcements on alternative outcomes such as liquidity,
systematic and idiosyncratic risk, and/or investment by institutional shareholder.
Lastly, our sample depleted from 140 for the event study analysis to 123
for the regression analysis because of missing data. Future research should seek
to gather larger sample sizes in order to accommodate more variables in
theoretical models, but also to rectify the problem of data missing from databases
such as COMPUSTAT. Interestingly, most event studies to date investigate
smaller, simpler frameworks because of the time it takes to gather enough event
dates, and therefore must draw conclusions from samples that many would
argue are too small (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, many social entrepreneurs
have suggested that we transition from an emphasis on economic value to social
value (Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum, 2009; Dacin, Dacin, and Matear, 2010).
This call combined with traditional admonitions of CSR behavior (Davis, 1973;
Friedman, 1970; Levitt, 1958) being in the distant past has potentially dangerous
implications for the firm moving forward. The substantial negative abnormal
returns reported in this study advocate that CRM campaigns have become
unfocused and primarily interested in short-term benefits. With a unique dataset
of CRM campaign announcements, we provide strong support that investors
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perceive CRM campaigns as a less efficient marketing communication tools in
terms of performance improvement.
According to Olson and Thjømøe (2009), a common industry criticism is
that there is a “lack of attention paid to measuring sponsorship effects relative to
the investment made”. Our findings explicate that executives and managers
should better justify their marketing spending, especially those expenditures
directed toward a cause. More research is needed to quantify the returns of CRM
activities in financial terms in order to convince various firm stakeholders of the
tool’s potential effectiveness. In particular, research should compare CRM
investments with other event communication strategies (e.g., advertising,
celebrity endorsement, traditional sponsorship). All of these strategies aim to
improve the brand’s image though the massive audience that the event attracts.
Marketers and investors alike need direction to recognize highly effective
marketing activities for continuous improvement of the firm (Joshi and Hanssens
2010).
This study substantiates a comprehensive model with both established
and original relationships. Therefore, it not only contributes to a better
understanding of the relationship between marketing investments and financial
performance (Ngobo et al. 2012), but also opens potentially novel avenues of
research. Among the eight explanatory variables used in this study, six had a
substantial influence on cumulative abnormal stock market returns: in-kind
donations, corporate reputation, market share, nonprofit governmental resource
dependence, and the interaction between reputation and both in-kind donations
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and nonprofit governmental resource dependence’s relationship with abnormal
returns. In-kind donations and nonprofit governmental resource dependence are
original to this study.
Furthermore, our findings indicate that stock market investors generally
respond negatively to the announcement of CRM campaigns. Therefore,
companies should rethink, or at the very least, underemphasize CRM
announcements, particularly when shareholders perceive the sponsored event so
poorly. The cross-sectional regression results suggest that investors pay special
attention to a few things. Specifically, investors seem to appreciate when firms
partner with causes that are capable of receiving in-kind resources. In-kind
resources apparently signal perceived fit, strategy, and foresight of a well thought
out marketing plan, capable of attracting future customers that are aligned with
the cause. These resources also do not hurt the firm’s bottom line financial
position, something that is very attractive to shareholders. Moreover, investors
also seem to perceive that firms choosing to partner with nonprofits receiving a
considerable amount of support from one source very poorly. In fact, the results
suggest that partnering with a nonprofit exhibiting this quality is sending an
extremely negative signal to investors, as it explains more variance in the
abnormal returns on stock price than any other variable in this study. The crosssectional regression results also suggest that corporate reputation and market
share are important to the investment community, as they significantly impact
cumulative abnormal stock returns for firms announcing CRM campaigns.
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Finally, although there has been a long history of empirical evidence
suggesting positive, non-significant, and even negative relationships between
CSR behavior and corporate financial performance (Cochran and Wood, 1984;
Freedman and Jaggi, 1982; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Ingram and Frazier, 1983;
Mackey, Mackey, and Barney, 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Orlitzky,
2013; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003; Pava and Krausz, 1996; Porter and
Kramer, 2006; Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Ullmann, 1985; Waddock and
Graves, 1997), this research provides the first evidence that investors generally
consider CRM investments (i.e., a more strategic form of CSR) an unwise
venture for the firm. The results provide new guidance for firms if they do decide
to utilize social investments. This research implies that the anticipated social and
institutional shift toward snowballing levels of CRM may need to be drastically
reconsidered. Alas, as Milton Friedman once said, “One of the great mistakes is
to judge policies and programs by their intentions rather than their results”. The
results of this study caution executives and managers to rethink current CRM
practices. If they do not, it appears that both the financial and consumer markets
feel they are simply slapping lipstick on a pig.
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APPENDIX
CRM Events Listed in Alphabetical Order
________________________________________________________________
Company Name

Nonprofit Organization(s)

Announcement Date

________________________________________________________________
American Express

Share our Strength

American Express

Product Red

3/1/2006

Anheuser Busch

Folds of Honor

5/5/2013

Apple

Product Red

10/15/2012

Apple

Product Red

8/14/2012

Apple

Product Red

12/7/2011

Apple

Product Red

1/9/2007

Apple

Product Red

10/13/2006

Archer Daniels Midland Co.

Feeding America

11/20/2012

AT&T

PADRES Contra El Cáncer

11/18/2008

AT&T

One Economy

AT&T

National Arbor Day Foundation

Bank of New York Mellon

American Red Cross

Cardinal Health

Cardinal Health Foundation

Caterpillar

Susan G. Komen

Coca Cola

American Red Cross

11/15/2013

Coca Cola

RED - Global Fund

12/19/2012

Coca Cola

World Wildlife Fund

Comcast

Khan Academy

Comcast

Operation HOPE

11/7/2013

Comcast

NCMEC

1/27/2011

Comcast

Big Brothers Big Sisters

11/6/2008

CVS Caremark Corporation

Direct Relief

9/13/2011

CVS Caremark Corporation

World Wildlife Fund

3/29/2010

CVS Caremark Corporation

Easter Seals

3/30/2006

CVS Caremark Corporation

Boston Children's Hospital

4/8/2005

Dell Computers

Susan G. Komen

2/5/2009

Dell Computers

Product Red

1/23/2008

Dow Chemical

American Red Cross

11/7/2012

Dow Chemical

STEM

6/30/2011

Dow Chemical

American Red Cross

3/15/2011

Dow Chemical

The Nature Conservancy

1/24/2011

Equifax

Operation HOPE

Exxonmobil

Texas Colleges and Universities

Exxonmobil

Malaria No More
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12/3/2013

6/14/2008
7/1/2005
11/13/2013
2/18/2009
3/9/2011

6/5/2007
12/16/2013

9/9/2013
5/14/2008
4/9/2008

Exxonmobil

Various Universities

5/2/2007

Federated Department Stores

Boys and Girls Club

Federated Department Stores

Reading is Fundamental

10/10/2008

Fedex

Teach for America

10/21/2013

Fedex

UNICEF

Fedex

Orbis International

Fedex

Christmas Spirit Foundation

Florida Power & Light Co.

The Salvation Army

General Electric

Newtown Community Center Built

General Electric

Susan G. Komen

9/15/2011

General Mills

Presidential Youth Fitness Program

2/27/2013

General Mills

WomenHeart

1/23/2008

Goldman Sachs

The Mission Continues

Google Inc.

One Economy

12/8/2009

Hewlett Packard

World Wildlife Fund

2/14/2008

Hewlett Packard

Susan G. Komen

Home Depot

The Mission Continues

Home Depot

Habitat for Humanity International

Home Depot

Rebuilding Together

12/7/2007

Honeywell International

NCMEC

10/4/2005

HSBC

World Wildlife Fund

6/11/2012

HSBC

Rebuilding Together

8/17/2007

Humana

Kaboom!

7/24/2012

IHOP

Children's Miracle Network

12/4/2006

Integrys Energy Group

National Arbor Day Foundation

4/25/2008

JCPenny

Habitat for Humanity International

5/2/2013

JCPenny

United Service Organization

7/2/2012

JCPenny

JCPenny Cares

7/20/2011

John Deere

America's Front Yard

9/27/2013

John Deere

The First Tee

Johnson & Johnson

Save the Children

4/12/2012

Johnson & Johnson

Save the Children

9/9/2010

JP Morgan & Chase

Habitat for Humanity International

JP Morgan & Chase

Donorschoose.org

JP Morgan & Chase

Operation HOPE

2/21/2007

Kellogg

Kellogg Foundation

9/11/2013

Kellogg

Action for Healthy Kids®

2/25/2013

Kellogg

American Red Cross

Kohl's

Susan G. Komen

9/23/2012

Kohl's

American Cancer Society

2/11/2010

Kohl's

Hunger Task Force

9/15/2009

Kraft

Feeding America

11/7/2008

Kraft

Kaboom!

5/27/2008

12/1/2012

8/22/2011
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8/3/2011
11/16/2005
9/16/2008
11/18/2013

12/10/2010

10/11/2011
8/24/2011
8/4/2009

2/7/2013

9/14/2012
4/3/2009

8/9/2011

Kroger

United Service Organization

Kroger

Susan G. Komen

4/24/2007

Lowe's Companies, Inc.

Rebuilding Together

7/27/2009

Lowe's Companies, Inc.

Muscular Dystrophy Association

3/6/2008

Marriott International

American Red Cross

6/3/2013

Marriott International

Amazonas Sustainable Foundation

Mastercard

Stand Up to Cancer

Mastercard

World Food Programme

10/8/2013

Mastercard

Stand Up to Cancer

7/12/2011

Mastercard

Operation HOPE

1/31/2011

Mastercard

Save the Children

5/6/2010

Metlife

Sesame Workshop

11/20/2013

Metlife

Metlife Foundation

12/7/2011

Microsoft

One Economy

9/20/2011

Microsoft

ninemillion.org

1/17/2007

Microsoft

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

3/12/2011

Morgan Stanley

Feeding America

5/20/2013

News Corp

Children's Miracle Network

5/8/2013

Nike

Michael J. Fox Foundation

9/8/2011

Nike

Product Red

11/30/2009

Nike

Product Red

4/3/2006

Novartis

Malaria No More

9/23/2013

Pepsi Co

Refresh Project

11/9/2009

PepsiCo

Make-A-Wish Foundation of America

3/14/2007

PepsiCo

Susan G. Komen

1/18/2006

Phillips-Van Heusen

American Red Cross

11/7/2012

Phillips-Van Heusen

American Red Cross

3/11/2011

Procter and Gamble

United Service Organization

12/1/2010

Procter and Gamble

International Olympic Committee

7/28/2010

Procter and Gamble

Habitat for Humanity International

8/26/2013

Procter and Gamble

Save the Children

Qualcomm

One Economy

Royal Dutch Shell

AARP Foundation

Ryder Systems

American Red Cross

Safeway

Safeway's eScrip

Safeway

Muscular Dystrophy Association

Safeway

Easter Seals

Sempra Energy

Armed Services YMCA

Southwest Airlines

Make-A-Wish Foundation of America

11/26/2010

Southwest Airlines

Honor Flight Network

11/11/2009

Starbucks

Product Red

11/27/2009

Starbucks

American Red Cross

9/8/2005

Steelcase

Institution Recycling Network

2/1/2009
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11/11/2013

4/7/2008
10/28/2013

4/2/2012
12/8/2009
2/2/2012
6/1/2009
8/19/2010
8/1/2006
3/31/2006
5/29/2009

Target

America's Promise Alliance

The Walgreen Company

Vitamin Angels

The Walgreen Company

American Diabetes Association

12/16/2011

The Walgreen Company

The Diabetes Research Institute

1/12/2011

The Walgreen Company

American Heart Association

1/12/2011

U.S. Bancorp

American Red Cross

3/4/2013

United Continental

American Red Cross

11/11/2013

UPS

Points of Light

12/19/2013

Verizon

United Way of Central Oklahoma

6/21/2013

Verizon

One Economy

11/1/2005

Verizon

New York Family Justice Center

1/13/2005

Visa

American Red Cross

1/15/2010

Wal-Mart

Sesame Workshop

1/17/2006

Walt Disney Company

Hands on Network (Points of Light)

Walt Disney Company

Various Environmental Organizations

5/14/2009

Warner Brothers Entertainment

Save the Children

1/23/2012

Wells Fargo

United Way Worldwide

5/30/2012

Western Union

Western Union Foundation

9/12/2012

Wyndham Worldwide

Starlight Foundation

3/18/2009
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10/27/2010
9/3/2013

10/29/2009

